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Abstract 
 
Analysing the methods of countering Holocaust denial in a comparative manner proves a 
most helpful platform to assess historical methodology and practice. This research seeks to 
evaluate the differing agendas and perspectives between historical and legal approaches to 
refuting Holocaust denial from the David Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd. and Deborah Lipstadt 
libel trial. 
This research finds that the Irving v. Penguin defence team effectively used the court 
as a framework to test Irving’s historical methods of evidence manipulation against the 
historical record. It is argued that this legal framework and the process of arbitration in law 
increases the accountability of historical writing, as exemplified in the four historian’s expert 
reports presented for the defence. Based on these reports, the Irving v. Penguin case has 
further practical application for wider historical research practices, as the historian’s ability to 
produce verifiable and justifiable conclusions are defended.  
This research contributes to the knowledge of methods and approaches of countering 
Holocaust denial and provides a basis to assess the unique and, at times, inter-dependent 
relationship between history and law, in its use of historical material evidence. The three 
approaches to Holocaust denial investigated in this research are: Deborah Lipstadt’s methods 
and assumptions, the methods of the defence barristers of Irving v. Penguin and the methods 
of the four professional historians as expert witnesses appearing in court.  
The trial’s focus on Irving’s methods, centralised Irving’s political agenda and 
delegitimising his reputation as an historian. Thus, the Irving v. Penguin trial is analysed as a 
case which clarifies the parameters of acceptable historical scholarship. Research into 
methods of countering the denial opens-up windows of analysis into the ways that historians 
can respond to wider phenomenon like negationism. This research provides helpful lines of 
enquiry to understand the wider issues of truth, verification and falsification of historical 
evidence.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Approach to Research 
 
Countering Holocaust denial proves a most helpful platform to assess historical methodology 
and practice. This thesis attempts to understand the nuances between historical and legal 
approaches to refuting Holocaust denial, taking the David Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd. and 
Deborah Lipstadt libel trial as a case study. While Deborah Lipstadt’s historical research 
concentrated on the ideological and anti-Semitic roots of Holocaust denial, the Irving v. 
Penguin trial in contrast, sought to deconstruct Irving’s denial from a different perspective. 
The trial approached denial from the premise that Irving’s misinterpretation of historical 
evidence was motivated by his anti-Semitic ideology, which superimposed his views onto the 
evidence. The use of historians as expert witnesses during the trial, therefore, provided new 
opportunities for historians to refute denial from the perspective of historical methodology. 
They found that Holocaust denial falls short of the basic standards of historical scholarship, 
as Richard Evans’ research stresses, the Irving v. Penguin trial is analysed as a case which 
clarifies the parameters of acceptable historical scholarship.1  
Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the analysis of both legal and historical 
approaches of Lipstadt, her barristers and the expert witnesses, sheds new light on the inter-
dependent relationship between history and law. The three methods of countering Holocaust 
denial, investigated in this research are: first, Deborah Lipstadt’s approach to denial from her 
                                                     
1 Richard J. Evans, Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust and the David Irving Trial, (New  
York: Basic Books, 2002). 
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historical perspective; second, the defence barristers’ approach to denial and their use of 
evidence in a court setting and third, the historical approach of these expert witnesses to 
refute denial in court. This research serves as a window to understand how historians have 
responded to phenomena like negationism or Holocaust denial, which provides helpful lines 
of enquiry into the wider issues of historical truth and the process of verifying historical 
evidence. 
The term “countering” Holocaust denial is used generally throughout this thesis, to 
encompass both the methods of refuting the denial arguments, through a direct refutation of 
their sources, as well as indirect methods of outlining and explaining their motives to 
challenge denial’s credibility. The latter approach to countering Holocaust denial, is 
characterised by Deborah Lipstadt’s research, while the Irving v. Penguin expert witness 
reports, which were designed to counter Irving’s claims in particular, take the former 
approach. When examining the legal approach to Holocaust denial in Chapter 4, “countering” 
has been used more cautiously because the legal strategy was designed to prevent the trial 
from turning into a debate on Irving’s interpretation of the Holocaust. For the sake of clarity, 
however, each chapter specifies the unique approaches which are compared and analysed in 
Chapter 6. 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives for Research 
 
Having briefly analysed previous approaches to Holocaust denial, the overall questions which 
inform this research are outlined as follows: To what extent do history and law differ in their 
use of historical evidence? To what extent does the acting as an expert witness in court hinder 
or enhance historical analysis? How do the legal standards of proof impact on the expert 
reports? Drawing from concepts in historical theory, the trial clarified the extent to which 
historians’ paradigms affect their interpretation of historical evidence. Is it possible, 
therefore, to distinguish between established facts and the interpretation of Holocaust history? 
Deborah Lipstadt’s research on Holocaust denial and her defence’s legal strategy in the 
Irving v. Penguin trial, draws together these questions on historical scholarship and practice 
in this thesis. 
The purpose of this research is to examine different perspectives to Holocaust denial 
from within history and law. Chapter 2 briefly summarises Irving’s position as an historian 
before the trial provides some context on the claimant, the defendants and the libel law. 
Based on Lipstadt’s writings and her subsequent involvement in the trial, Chapter 3 
investigates how Lipstadt countered Holocaust denial in her book Denying the Holocaust, 
within an academic setting.2 This is significant to investigate Lipstadt’s wider world-view to 
understand her approach to Holocaust denial. This chapter lays the ground-work to assess the 
different historical methods of countering Irving’s denial, in contrast to the methods 
employed by historians during the trial. Chapter 4 investigates how the legal strategy of the 
Irving v. Penguin trial was constructed to counter denial within English libel law. It 
investigates how a barrister’s forensic approach to countering Irving’s Holocaust denial in 
court, differs from an historian’s approach. This chapter discusses the unique nature of 
                                                     
2 Deborah E. Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, (New York: Plume  
1993). 
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advocacy in this trial, in which the historian’s work becomes accountable to the scrutiny of 
both parties and to the judge.  
Chapter 5 evaluates the role of the historian as an expert witness, analysing the use of 
their expert reports for the defence. Similar to the legal approach examined in Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 turns to examine whether the court created an environment for the historians to 
adopt a more rigorous and forensic analysis of the evidence to meet the demands of the 
defence. It further analyses how the four historical reports by professional historians, Robert 
Jan Van Pelt, Richard Evans, Peter Longerich and Christopher Browning, differed from 
Deborah Lipstadt’s approach to denial both in purpose and methods. The conclusions from 
this research suggest further possibilities for historians to glean from the historical and legal 
methods of the Irving v. Penguin trial, which are analysed and discussed in Chapter 6.  
This research finds that the defence team effectively used the court as a necessary 
framework to test Irving’s historical methods of evidence manipulation against the historical 
record. It is argued that this legal framework and the process of arbitration in law increases 
the accountability of historical writing.3 The case strengthened the historian’s ability to 
produce verifiable and justifiable conclusions, because the legal standards of proof were 
applied to their analysis of the documentary evidence. Yet how applicable is this approach to 
wider historical practice if it was contained within a legal setting? The historian Robert Jan 
Van Pelt who served as one of the expert witnesses, argues that historians were able to 
produce a forensic and systematic rebuttal of denial because they “converged evidence” to 
verify the historical record.4 It is this method of convergence, which is intended to “enhance 
the validity of research findings”, is applicable to further historical research.5 
                                                     
3 Conversation with Richard Rampton QC and Heather Rogers QC, 10 May 2018, Temple London. 
4 Robert Jan Van Pelt, Irving v. Penguin, Van Pelt: The Van Pelt Report, (2000), Part Four: Concerning Denial,  
§ VII Auschwitz and Holocaust Denial, footnote 556. 
5 Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why  
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1.3 Research Methodology and Sources 
 
Evaluating methodologies informs this research on Holocaust denial. The basis from which 
we construct knowledge, particularly knowledge of the past, can be shaped by personal 
world-views or paradigms rather than by the documentary evidence. This thesis outlines the 
importance of analysing historians’ methodologies, which includes their approach to the 
source material, their presuppositions and their methods of writing history. Can a combined 
historical and legal approach be used to counter Holocaust denial more effectively?  
Three types of data are consulted for this research are as follows: First, a sample of 
written literature by Deborah Lipstadt forms the majority of the source material for Chapter 2 
– treating her work as primary material in this research. Second, the 33-day trial transcripts, 
the judgment, the witness statements and the expert witness reports by historians Richard 
Evans, Peter Longerich, Robert Jan Van Pelt and Christopher Browning, and political-
scientist, Hajo Funke, are analysed as the evidence for the third and fourth chapters. As 
Sandra Mathison suggests, the combination of sources forms a triangulated method which 
“provides evidence for the researcher to make sense of … social phenomenon” like denial.6 
A third area of analysis, which triangulates this method is through the semi-structured 
interviews conducted with Deborah Lipstadt in September 2017 and Richard Rampton QC 
and Heather Rogers QC in May 2018. These interviews were designed to provide the legal 
input and perspective needed to understand the technicalities of the case further. The primary 
purpose of these interviews was to discuss the aims of this research, to gain advice and to 
provide an opportunity to clarify aspects of my research with experts in the field. The 
questions and issues raised in these interviews informed my approach to this research, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Do They Say It? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 32-33, 117; Sandra Mathison, 
“Why Triangulate?” Educational Researcher, 17:2, (March, 1988), p. 13. 
6 Sandra Mathison, “Why Triangulate?” Educational Researcher, 17:2, (March, 1988), pp. 15. 
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however, the interviews were not a means of data collection. This is to avoid opinions 
verbally expressed eighteen years after the Irving v. Penguin trial, forming the evidence that 
is used in this research. Any post-trial commentary by the Deborah Lipstadt and the expert 
witnesses has been extracted from their published accounts of the trial.  
It is worth noting the purpose of oral history methodology and some potential pitfalls 
of oral history which have been accounted for in this research. While oral history 
methodologies are useful and have provided a three-dimensional picture of the Irving v. 
Penguin case for this research, Andrea Harjek helpfully notes that “the subjective nature of 
oral data and the intersubjective relation of the interviewer and interviewee can lead to wrong 
or incomplete information, requiring supplementary and comparative research of written 
documents”.7 This research has sought to combine the use of primary documentary evidence, 
the trial transcripts, written expert reports from the trial, with personal interviews and with 
secondary literature on the subject. This is to provide as multi-faceted approach to the 
evidence as possible, without compromising the integrity of the research by relying on oral 
data. Furthermore, methodological plurality, or combining historical and legal approaches, 
helps to build up a “fuller and more comprehensive picture” of the methods of countering 
Holocaust denial.8 This is particularly the case when evaluating the trial transcripts and expert 
witness reports of the Irving v. Penguin trial, as these documents provide further insight into 
the legal framework of countering denial.  
This research refers to documents of the original trial documents, statements and 
transcripts as well as secondary literature, including newspaper reports of the trial, and any 
gleanings summarised from the two interviews conducted with Deborah Lipstadt in 
September 2017, and Rampton and Rogers in May 2018. This research treats Deborah 
                                                     
7 Andrea Harjek, “Oral History Methodology”, Sage Research Methods Cases, (London: Sage Publications,  
2014), p. 13. 
8 Patrick McNeill, Steve Chapman, Research Methods, Third Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 23. 
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Lipstadt’s work, as primary documents, since her work is the subject of analysis and therefore 
is an original source. Similar treatment is given to the published expert reports from the trial, 
which are examined as primary documents in Chapter 5. The trial documents have been 
digitised on Holocaust Denial On Trial’s website, to increase accessibility for researchers, as 
part of a project between Emory University and the Tam Institute for Jewish Studies.9 When 
referring to denial literature or speeches cited in the trial, these are extracted primarily from 
the transcripts themselves, or from Deborah Lipstadt’s History on Trial, and Richard Evans, 
Lying About Hitler which have published large portions of the source material included in the 
process of discovery. Other citations of Irving’s work are either quoted directly from the 
passages discussed during the trial, or directly from his published books. In these cases, clear 
footnotes of the original source and the publication where it was found, accompany any of 
these primary sources. 
In terms of references to the sources and claims made by Holocaust deniers for this 
research, Irving’s books have been consulted and referenced accordingly. However, due to 
the research focus on Irving, other arguments by deniers which were provided as brief 
examples to substantiate an argument, are referenced from the secondary literature from 
which they were reproduced. References to the beliefs and views held by other Holocaust 
deniers such as Arthur Butz, Ernst Zündel and Robert Faurisson are either taken from their 
interviews in the press, which expressed their personal views, or extracts from their own 
publications which have been mostly cited in Deborah Lipstadt’s Denying the Holocaust 
(1994), Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman’s Denying History (2000), and Kenneth S. 
Stern’s Holocaust Denial (1993). 
Critical analysis of both the historical and the legal approaches to countering 
Holocaust denial is not only necessary, but long overdue. Historians have contested issues 
                                                     
9 Holocaust Denial On Trial, www.hdot.org/. For more information about the project, see  
www.hdot.org/about (last accessed 01.08.2018). 
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relating to the reliability of evidence and the impact of the historian’s subjectivities on their 
conclusions. The process of verifying the historical record in response to denial and an 
analysis of the historical and legal approaches to countering Holocaust denial is essential to 
provide balance to these arguments. The literature review takes a thematic approach to assess 
the gaps in existing literature, and how the legal strategy in the Irving v. Penguin trial and the 
historical approach to countering Holocaust denial, are useful to further research on 
contemporary Holocaust denial.  
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1.4 A Brief Literature Review 
 
Let us turn to a brief discussion of the methods that historians have employed to counter 
denial within historical discourse. A variety of approaches range from ad hominem criticisms 
to in-depth analysis of their arguments, to analysing the rhetorical tactics of deniers.10 The 
development of the field which began to counter Holocaust denial during the 1980s and 
1990s focussed on the theoretical challenges to history, identifying the political and anti-
Semitic agenda which influenced the movement. Among the first historians to tackle 
Holocaust denial were the Holocaust historians Yisrael Gutman in Denying the Holocaust 
(1985) and Gill Seidel’s The Holocaust Denial: Antisemitism and the New Right (1986), 
which provided a general overview of its ideological roots.11  
The French historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet published Assassins of Memory (1992), as a 
direct response to the French denier Robert Faurisson, and took a historiographical and 
theoretical approach to countering denial.12 Having concentrated his critiques on relativism 
and deconstructionism which helped to foster Holocaust denial in France, Vidal-Naquet 
summarised his approach to countering their arguments “as one might with a sophist… who 
seems like a speaker of truths”, deniers’ arguments have to be “dismantled piece by piece” to 
prove their falsity.13 Moreover, Vidal-Naquet argued that to substantially “demolish a 
discourse takes time and space”, often of the kind that historians do not afford.14 Similarly, 
                                                     
10 For further references to some of the more critical responses to individual Holocaust deniers in the press, see  
Alan Bayless, “Holocaust Trials Can Make Hatemongers Appear as Victims”, Wall Street Journal, 9  
April, 1985, p. 1; Douglas Wertheimer, “Butz Is Back: Northwestern Holocaust Denier Marks an  
Anniversary With A Page on The Internet's World Wide Web”, Baltimore Jewish Times, 229:7, 14  
June, 1996, p. 88. 
11 Yisrael Gutman, Denying the Holocaust (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1985); Gill Seidel, The  
Holocaust Denial: Antisemitism and the New Right (Beyond the Pale Publications, 1986), fuller list of  
early publications in Richard J. Evans, Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust and the David Irving  
Trial, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 109. 
12 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust, (New York: Columbia  
University Press, 1992). 
13 Ibid, p. 3. 
14 Ibid, p. 51. 
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Lawrence Douglas observes an initial “reluctance” among “serious academics to study the 
structure of deniers’ arguments” and to assign much of their time to refute denial.15 In this 
respect, few historians attempted the task of systematically deconstructing the arguments of 
Holocaust deniers and their claims to revise the historical record in a systematic way. 
Tracing the roots of denial to anti-Semitism, Kenneth Stern in Holocaust Denial 
(1993) published a number of interviews by deniers, reviewed their methods of gaining 
legitimacy in academic and public circles, and listed the major publications of deniers to 
increase an awareness of the pseudo-scholarly literature which was beginning to circulate on 
American campuses.16 Stern argues that “Holocaust denial is not about historical truth. It is 
about anti-Jewish hatred as part of a political agenda – and should be confronted as such”.17 
Instead of focusing on the methodological flaws in Holocaust deniers’ arguments, Stern 
concentrates his attention on confronting denial by revealing its anti-Semitic apparel. Both 
Stern and Lipstadt’s approach sought to remove the academic credibility that deniers were 
seeking by arguing that “professional deniers are not Holocaust scholars, but anti-Semitic 
imposters”.18 James Najarian adopts a similar argument which centres on the rhetoric of 
Holocaust denial. He argues that the pseudo scholarly methods of the deniers and their 
attempt to create “a second “version of history”, finds ground in “ideals of free speech and 
reasonable inquiry” in history.19 In response to these approaches, Alexander Karn argues that 
as historians “our commitment to objectivity is our best riposte to the deniers”.20 What was 
lacking in the early literature on the growing and complex phenomenon of denial, however, 
                                                     
15 Lawrence Douglas, “The Memory of Judgment: The Law, the Holocaust, and Denial”, History and Memory,  
7:2, (Fall-Winter 1995), p. 109. 
16 Kenneth S. Stern, Holocaust Denial, (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1993). 
17 Ibid, p. xii. 
18 Ibid, p. 59. 
19 James Najarian, “Gnawing at History: The Rhetoric of Holocaust Denial”, The Midwest Quarterly,  
39:1, (Autumn, 1997), pp. 79-81. 
20 Alexander Karn, “Toward a Philosophy of Holocaust Education: Teaching Values without Imposing  
Agendas”, The History Teacher, 45:2, (February 2012), p. 228 
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was a systematic approach which would expose the insupportable methodology on which 
deniers relied. 
However, in 2000, Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman’s research combined a 
historical and theoretical approach to deconstruct deniers’ arguments through methods of 
corroborating and converging documentary evidence.21 Shermer argued in 1994 that tactics of 
deniers often rely “on what might be called post hoc rationalization – an after-the-fact 
reasoning to justify contrary evidence”.22 Analysing these tactics in practice, Shermer argues 
that the denier will demand that a “single proof” be found to prove that the gas chambers 
existed, for example, and will then take the evidence presented to them to find an alternative 
explanation; however extreme or implausible.23 In practice, deniers take: 
“an eyewitness account by a survivor who says he heard about gassing Jews while he was at 
Auschwitz. The revisionist says that survivors exaggerate and that their memories are 
unsound. Another survivor tells another story different in details but with the core similarity 
that Jews were gassed at Auschwitz. The revisionist claims that rumors were floating 
throughout the camps and many survivors incorporated them into their memories”.24  
How then does an historian respond to such methods of denial? Shermer and Grobman 
suggest that combining different types of documentary evidence, helps to narrow the denier’s 
ability to question the evidence. This nuanced historical approach lays the groundwork for 
understanding the methods of convergence used by both historians and lawyers in the Irving 
v. Penguin trial.  
Christopher Norris argues that this flawed history is the product of the “misreading 
and manipulative use of evidence, the suppression of crucial facts and the creation of certain 
selective amnesia”.25 Irving was found to have adhered to similar methods in his work. A 
                                                     
21 Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why  
Do They Say It? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 34. 
22 Michael Shermer, “Proving the Holocaust: The Refutation of Revisionism and The Restoration of History,”  
Skeptic, 2:4 (1994), p. 42f. 
23 Michael Shermer, quoted in Robert Jan Van Pelt, Irving v. Penguin, Van Pelt: The Van Pelt Report,  
(2000), Part Four: Concerning Denial, § VII Auschwitz and Holocaust Denial, footnote 556. 
24 Ibid, p. 42f. 
25 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction and the Interests of Theory, (Norman: Oklahoma, 1989), p. 16; quoted in,  
Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History, (London: Granta, 1997), p. 238. 
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legacy of the Irving v. Penguin trial was that it clarified the role of the historian and 
acceptable standards of scholarship. As the historian G. R. Elton suggests, “knowledge of the 
sources and competent criticism of them… are the basic requirements of a reliable 
historiography”.26 Discrediting Holocaust denial must begin, therefore, by challenging their 
knowledge of the source material and their ability to consider different perspectives when 
arriving at their conclusions. As Judge Gray argued, the issue of the reliability of Irving’s 
views could not be separated from his manipulation of “the historical record in order to make 
it conform with his political beliefs”.27 Equally renowned for his theoretical reflection on 
historical practice, E. H. Carr’s argument applies to the court’s assessment of Irving’s 
standards of scholarship, that: “good historians will rise above the limitations of their own 
time… by recognizing the nature and extent of their own prejudices” and that they “will write 
better history if they are self-conscious about their political and intellectual starting point”.28 
Evans applies these postulates to his analysis of Irving’s historical methods in his expert 
report, which stems from a commitment to understanding historical practice.29  
Characterising the mainstream interpretation of the role of the historian, in opposition 
to Leopold von Ranke’s positivist view, Charles A. Beard wrote in 1935 that “no historian 
can describe the past as it actually was”.30 Instead their “selection of facts, his emphasis, his 
omission, his organisation, his method of presentation – bears a relation to his own 
personality and the age and circumstances in which he lives”.31 Beard’s awareness of these 
various subjectivities argues that historical interpretation is guided by present assumptions, 
and therefore affects historians’ interpretation of the past. Yet, while personal subjectivities 
                                                     
26 G. R. Elton, The Practice of History, Fourteenth Edition, (London: William Collins, 1990), p. 87.  
27 Mr Justice Charles Gray, Irving v. Penguin, Judgment, § 13.162. 
28 Richard J. Evans, an introduction to E. H. Carr, What Is History? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, originally  
published, 1961) p. xxx 
29 Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History, (London: Granta, 1997), pp. 2-9. 
30 Charles A. Beard, “That Noble Dream” (1935), in F. Stern ed., The Varieties of History, (New York: Vintage  
Books, 1973), pp. 323-26, quoted in Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: Who Says 
the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It? (Berkeley: University of California Press,  
2000), p. 25. 
31 Ibid, p. 25. 
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influence the historian, it is important to stress a distinction between the ideas which are 
formed through interpretation and the evidence from which historians base their arguments. 
To apply this to methods of countering denial, the Italian historian Arnaldo Momigliano 
argues that “the historian has to assume some ordinary commonsense criteria for judging his 
own evidence”. 32 Thus, a conscientious approach to historical research is essential to be able 
to verify the historical record when it is challenged. 
Quentin Skinner argues for a distinction between historical facts and their 
interpretation, and highlights how “false beliefs point to failures of reasoning.”33 In a similar 
approach, Norman Denzin argues that if “facts are objective” then “they are different from 
interpretations, which are subjective and hence cannot be proven but only made more or less 
credible.”34 The defence barristers during the Irving v. Penguin trial frequently made this 
distinction to separate between Irving’s sources and his methods of distorting the evidence, 
reducing the credibility of his findings. However, it is clear from the trial that Holocaust 
denial is more than a failure in reasoning, it is a deliberate distortion of evidence to support 
its claims and is rooted not just in a questionable ideology, but in a flawed methodology. 
These debates provide a broad conceptual basis for understanding the criteria from which the 
historians as expert witnesses, and subsequently Judge Gray, evaluated Irving’s Holocaust 
denial through a methodological lens. The trial marked a crucial difference from the way the 
historians had previously approached denial in historical discourse, opening up new methods 
of deconstructing denial with a more in-depth, forensic focus on Irving’s sources. 
                                                     
32 Arnaldo Momigliano, Settimo Contributo Alla Storia Degli Studi Classici e Del Mondo Antico, (Rome, 1984),   
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18:1, (Autumn,1991), p. 91. 
33 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method, Volume 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2002), p. 2. 
34 Norman K. Denzin, “The Facts and Fictions of Qualitative Inquiry”, Qualitative Inquiry, 2:2, (June, 1996),    
p. 231. 
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Analysing this relationship between historians and their involvement in defamation 
cases, Antoon De Baets’ research provides fruitful lines of inquiry to assess the 
historiographical advantages of the Irving v. Penguin trial. Although Irving attempted to use 
defamation law to censor criticism of his work, De Baets concludes that defamation cases can 
cause historians to reflect on historical practice in two ways.35 First, “if the historians’ 
position is confirmed by the judge, they may feel that their scholarship and professional 
responsibility are strengthened” and second, that “if the judge disagrees with their position”, 
as Judge Gray did of Irving, “and if that position is indeed untenable, historians should, at the 
very least, conduct better and more responsible research in the future.”36 Both concepts are 
applicable to the Irving v. Penguin case, in which Lipstadt’s criticism of Irving was 
confirmed and Richard Evans’ paradigm of a measure of objectivity in historical practice was 
strengthened. Wendie Ellen Schneider’s legal insights on Irving v. Penguin, re-iterates that 
the case put “historical methodology on trial”, and therefore, vindicates the “conscientious 
historian” in their role as expert witnesses.37  
When researching the relationship between Holocaust denial and the law, current 
literature has mainly gravitated towards the problematic issues of censorship and legal 
intervention in historical enquiry.38 These are not debates which can be discussed in detail 
here, but it is important to understand how this literature perceives the role of the law in 
Holocaust trials. Gunter Lewy argues that genocide denial laws in Europe define “official” 
forms of truth to therefore shape the memory of the past.39 Similarly, Marouf A. Hasian 
                                                     
35 Antoon De Baets, “Defamation Cases Against Historians”, History and Theory, 41:3, (October, 2002), p. 346. 
36 Ibid, p.357-358. 
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Research Institute, 1998), pp. 67-88; Russell L. Weaver, Nicolas Depierre, Laurence Boissier,  
“Holocaust Denial and Governmentally Declared Truth: French and American Perspectives”, Texas 
Tech Law Review, 41:495 (2009), pp. 495-517. 
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criticised the Irving v. Penguin trial for its method of countering denial from a 
methodological perspective because, he argues, the law sought to govern “particular views of 
history or historiographic methods” which were judged in a court as “the” standard in 
history.40 Lawrence Douglas, however, distinguishes that there is a “crucial difference 
between using the law to clarify or elucidate the historical record,” and “relying upon the law 
to police a history.”41 Often, these debates fail to recognise that, first Irving v. Penguin was 
brought by Irving himself, and that the purpose of libel laws is different to that of criminal 
cases that they assess. Thus, the trial was an exercise of “safeguarding historical truth”, rather 
using the law to establish that truth.42 
Few accounts of the trial, the judgment and its significance to historical practice, have 
analysed the case in as great a depth as the post-trial publications of the expert witnesses’ 
reports. Richard Evans in Lying About Hitler (2000), is a condensed version of his expert 
witness report presented for the defence in the Irving v. Penguin trial.43 Evans removes any 
remaining credibility of Holocaust denial by focusing on Irving’s historical “method”, which 
he suggests the media reports paid little attention to, producing a “distorted” picture about the 
trial.44 Eaglestone identifies that Evans’ report was so convincing because he was able to 
demonstrate the “ontological division between the past and the discourse about the past” in 
order to prove how Irving’s “interpretation” deviated from the historical evidence.45 Peter 
Longerich’s The Unwritten Order (2001) summaries his methods of proving “Hitler’s almost 
continuous involvement” in the Final Solution by “collecting the many individual decisions 
                                                     
40 Marouf A. Jr. Hasian, Canadian Civil Liberties, Holocaust Denial, and the Zündel Trials”, Communications  
and the Law, 43, (September, 1999), pp. 133-134. 
41 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust, (New  
Haven: Yale, 2001), p. 256. 
42 Lawrence Douglas, “The Memory of Judgment: The Law, the Holocaust, and Denial”, History and Memory,  
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made with regard to the ‘Jewish question’” which forms an “overall picture” of Nazi policy.46 
Although, Hitler had not issued a physical written order for the annihilation of the Jews in 
Europe, “there is clear evidence that reveal his essential commitment to radicalise persecution 
to the extreme”.47 Robert Jan Van Pelt’s The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving 
Trial (2002), is an example of Shermer and Grobman’s “convergence of evidence” and 
Christopher Browning’s The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy September 1939-March 1942 (2003), and Deborah Lipstadt’s personal account of the 
trial published as History on Trial: My Day in Court with a Holocaust Denier (2005), all 
cover the trial in significant documentary detail.  
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1.5 Summary 
 
This research serves as a guide to understand the methods of countering Holocaust denial 
from the Irving v. Penguin trial and provides practical application to current research as 
denial continues to evolve in the present political milieu.48 It is hoped that the conclusions 
drawn from this thesis, particularly regarding the standards of academic scholarship, might 
serve as an analytical framework to apply to other areas of historical enquiry also. Limited to 
the scope of the Irving v. Penguin trial, there is a narrow focus on analysing the methods of 
the defence barristers, Richard Rampton and Heather Rogers in their presentation of the case, 
and the five expert witnesses of Richard Evans, Peter Longerich, Christopher Browning, 
Robert Jan Van Pelt and Hajo Funke. The conceptual approach adopted in this research 
assesses Holocaust denial within the framework of reliability and issues of verifying 
historical fact in research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Context of the Irving v. Penguin Libel Trial 
 
 
2.1 The Claimant and the Defendants in Irving v. Penguin 
 
Irving v. Penguin was a unique trial because it was the first instance that a Holocaust denier 
sued an academic and professional historian for libel.49 In two previous legal cases against 
leading Holocaust deniers Robert Faurisson in France and the German–Canadian Ernst 
Zündel, it was the state that brought the case for denying the Holocaust. Uniquely, Irving v. 
Penguin was a civil libel trial brought by Irving, a Holocaust “revisionist”, against Lipstadt 
and her publisher Penguin Books. Irving claimed material and reputational damage for the 
words Lipstadt published about him in her book Denying the Holocaust: The Growing 
Assault on Truth and Memory (1993).50 Irving alleged that the book contained multiple 
defamatory statements which he believed were part of a “well-funded and reckless worldwide 
campaign of personal defamation” against his reputation and career.51 Similarly, he argued 
that the instances which Lipstadt wrote about Irving were part of “a concerted attempt to ruin 
his reputation as an historian.”52 After four years of research and legal preparation, the case 
was tried in the British High Court of Justice on 11 January 2000.53  
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Deborah E. Lipstadt (1947–) is a Jewish American historian and Dorot Professor of 
Modern Jewish History and Holocaust Studies, who has been teaching at Emory University, 
Atlanta, Georgia since 1993.54 Among a number of academic and professional appointments, 
which include consulting for the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, Lipstadt has 
written five books and over 30 articles relating to various aspects of Holocaust history, 
contemporary responses to the Holocaust and the persecution of the Jews.55 Lipstadt began 
her career specialising in American press reaction to the suffering of the Jews between 1933 
and 1945.56 Approached by two renowned and respected Holocaust historians Yehuda Bauer 
and Yisrael Gutman, Lipstadt was asked to write about the growing phenomenon of 
Holocaust denial.57 Denying the Holocaust was later published by Plume, a branch of 
Penguin Books UK, in 1994.58 Lipstadt critiqued a number of key Holocaust deniers, one of 
whom was the British historical writer, David Irving. Lipstadt outlined Irving’s method and 
argued that his work was synonymous with the Holocaust denial movement as a whole. 
Lipstadt, therefore, effectively deconstructed Holocaust denial within her seminal academic 
work.  
David John Cawdell Irving (1938–), known as David Irving, is a British independent 
writer of military and Second World War history who published books and biographies on 
the Nazi German leadership. Irving published his most well-known work, Hitler’s War, in 
1977 (republished in 1991), in which he argued that “Hitler’s own role in the “Final Solution 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bench Division, 11 April), appeal denied (18 December, 2000); HCJ/ QBD Irving v. Penguin Day 1,  
“Initial Proceedings”, p. 1 Lines 1-5. 
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York: The Free Press, 1986). 
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of the Jewish problem” has never been examined.”59 Therefore, he styled himself as 
providing a valuable service to scholarship by deviating from what he claimed was the “inter-
historian incest” of historiography on Hitler.60 Irving summarised his approach as viewing 
history “through Hitler’s eyes, from behind his desk”, which he contends “was bound to yield 
different perspectives.”61 By presenting his work as an alternative, under-researched, 
“perspective”, Irving sought to disguise an ideological and historically unsound thesis as a 
legitimate scholarly attempt to understand the “other side” of the war. The publisher of 
Irving’s Churchill’s War (1987) endorsed Irving for his “theories” which, they claimed, were 
“developed from original source material – diaries, letters, documents and archives” and 
provided “a controversial view of history”.62 
Academic and popular responses to Irving’s publications were overly receptive to his 
“controversial” views. In a review of Irving’s Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, 
published in the New York Review of Books, Gordon Craig wrote: “the fact is that he knows 
more about National Socialism than most professional scholars in his field”, and they “owe 
more than they are always willing to admit to his energy as a researcher and to the scope and 
vigor of his publications”.63 Despite Irving’s notions about Hitler and the Final Solution, 
being “offensive to large numbers of people”, Craig went on to claim that “such people as 
Irving have an indispensable part in the historical enterprise and we dare not disregard their 
views”.64 This implies that Irving’s work is controversial, yet, he argues, it is equally useful 
to historians because “it will stimulate new discussion and research”.65 Craig was not alone in 
his endorsement of Irving from an academic perspective. The respected historian Hugh 
                                                     
59 David Irving, Hitler’s War, (London: Viking Press, 1977), p. xiii. 
60 Ibid, p. xiii. 
61 Ibid, p. xvi. 
62 David Irving, Churchill’s War, (Bullsbrook: Veritas, 1987), p. iii. 
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Trevor-Roper, in his analysis of Irving in 1977, wrote: “no praise can be too high for his 
indefatigable scholarly industry”.66 Yet, Trevor-Roper raised issues which Craig did not, 
responding to Irving’s reliance on the so-called “solid primary sources” by questioning: 
“How reliable is his historical method? How sound is his judgement? We ask these questions 
particularly of a man who, like Mr Irving, makes a virtue – almost a profession – of using 
arcane sources to affront established opinions”.67 Nonetheless, Irving’s “scholarly” reputation 
quickly vanishes when his conclusions and sources are investigated further. 
Those who were likely to endorse Irving’s “scholarly approach” or his primary 
document research, were, for the most part those who gave Irving’s work only a superficial 
overview. However, more scrupulous analyses were discerning of Irving’s ideological 
impositions on historical sources. Although Irving’s views were attracting increasing 
attention, his work was beginning to be critiqued and challenged by historians as early as 
1979. Among the foremost of Irving’s critics was Charles W. Sydnor who, when analysing 
Hitler’s War, questioned the veracity of Irving’s claim that Hitler did not order the Final 
Solution. This is exemplified when Irving claimed that: 
“Precisely when the order was given and in what form has, admittedly, never been established 
… The incontrovertible evidence is that Hitler ordered on November 30, 1941, that there was 
to be ‘no liquidation’ of the Jews (without much difficulty, I found in Himmler’s private files 
his own handwritten note on this). On several subsequent dates in 1942 Hitler made–in 
private–statements which are totally incompatible with the notion that he knew that the 
liquidation program had in fact begun”.68  
Sydnor identified that within a “cultish” growth of historiography on Hitler’s personal life, 
career and policies, there was a “wide disparity of ability and expertise” evident in Irving’s 
work, compared to established historians in the field.69 Irving’s thesis, therefore, attracted 
attention as it appeared distinct from the standard works on Hitler and the Third Reich, 
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particularly those by Martin Broszat and Sir Ian Kershaw. Sydnor discerned that Irving’s 
views were the product and “outgrowth of Mr. Irving’s long fascination with Hitler and Nazi 
Germany”, which motivated his “fully revisionist portrait of Adolf Hitler”.70 Identifying four 
major pitfalls in Irving’s work, Sydnor highlights the omissions, misrepresentation, 
mistranslation and his use of invalid or questionable source material, as forming the “crux” of 
his flawed arguments on Hitler and the Holocaust.71  
John Lukacs’ wider historiographic review in The Hitler of History (1998), critically 
analysed Irving, noting a “gradual progression” from “partial exoneration” of Hitler, to 
becoming “an unrepentant admirer of Hitler”.72 Lukacs records the worrying receptivity of 
Irving’s work among historians, particularly since his books had reached best seller lists in 
Germany, and was heralded as a “master historian of the Third Reich”.73 Viking Press, the 
publisher of Hitler’s War suggested that Hitler was “assuredly de-demonized” but that his 
books would “stand athwart the annals of Nazi Germany and World War II from this time 
forward”.74 A similar endorsement was given by historian John Keegan in 1996 when he 
wrote that Hitler’s War was “certainly among the half-dozen most important books on 1939–
45”.75 Irving’s reputation among scholars was perplexing, particularly since “few reviewers 
and critics of Irving’s books, including professional historians… bothered to examine them 
carefully enough”.76  
How does an historian whose work was met with both praise and criticism, come to 
be described by the historian Yehuda Bauer as “the mainstay of Holocaust denial in 
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Europe”?77 As the political scientist Hajo Funk records, Irving’s gradual progression from 
soft “revisionism”, to admiration of Hitler and conversion to Holocaust denial, was based on 
his associations with right-wing political groups.78 A defining moment in Irving’s public 
denial came in 1988, when he testified at the Ernst Zündel trial that there was no “overall 
Reich policy to kill the Jews”, that “no documents whatsoever show that a Holocaust had 
ever happened” and that the gas chambers at Auschwitz were, therefore, “an impossibility”.79 
The UK-based international publishing company Penguin Books Ltd., who published 
Lipstadt’s book in July 1994, received Irving’s writ to withdraw publication in November 
that year. By September 1996, Irving filed a suit against both Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin 
Books.80 Richard Rampton of One Brick Court, was hired to represent Lipstadt and Heather 
Rogers QC, an expert in media and defamation law, was assigned as co-counsel for the 
defence, representing the first defendant, Penguin UK. It is understood that Irving, rather than 
filing a suit immediately after the first publication in the US, waited to file his lawsuit in the 
UK because British libel laws favour the Claimant.81 Since British libel laws place the burden 
of proof on the defendant, Mark Grief argues that Irving’s suit attempted “to gag his 
critics”.82 Nonetheless, the defence transformed the trial into “a public airing” of his 
methods.83 
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Defamation law states that “a publication is defamatory if it is likely to ‘injure the 
reputation of another by exposing’ the person ‘to hatred, contempt or ridicule’”.84 The legal 
concept of defamation deals with the broader issues of “libel”, which is reputational damage 
as a result of published material, and “slander” which refers to verbal accusations.85 In the 
UK, it does not constitute libel if the defendant proves that the published material is true. 
British libel law assumes that the potential defamatory words expressed are false and would 
cause damage, and therefore, need to be proven otherwise in court.86 In order for Lipstadt’s 
assessment of Irving to be proven true, Irving’s reliance on evidence to claim that the 
Holocaust was a “hoax” had to be examined to respond to Lipstadt’s assessment that Irving 
was a Holocaust denier. Furthermore, Lipstadt’s specific statements about Irving were likely 
to carry general implications as to his character and his historical methods, therefore, the 
defence could not argue that Irving had misinterpreted the meaning of Lipstadt’s words.87 
Under an exception in Section 5 of the 1952 Defamation Act, the defence opted instead to 
prove “justification”, which argued that the truth of Lipstadt’s specific statements did not 
need to be proved if the implications, that Irving is a Holocaust denier, could be proved.88 
Lipstadt’s historical analysis of Irving was deemed libellous because it could influence the 
general reader of her book to form a negative impression of Irving. This libel trial uniquely 
posed between two historians, therefore, challenged lawyers and historians to distinguish 
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between “legitimate criticism” in historiography and “prejudiced vilification”.89 The 
significance of the Irving v. Penguin trial lay in the defence’s strategy to counter Irving’s 
claims by applying both legal and historical methods in order to establish that distinction. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Deborah Lipstadt's Approach to Holocaust Denial:       
A Historical Perspective 
 
 
“We are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as 
reason is left free to combat it” 
      -   Thomas Jefferson.90 
 
“You are mistaken if you believe that anything at all can be achieved by reason. In years past I 
thought so myself and kept protesting against the monstrous infamy that is anti-Semitism. But 
is it useless, completely useless.”  
 -   Theodor Mommsen.91 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Logic and reason reach their limit when faced with the phenomenon of Holocaust denial. 
Quoting Thomas Jefferson and Theodor Mommsen’s aphorisms in the first pages of Denying 
the Holocaust, Deborah Lipstadt signals that her approach to denial is based on her wider 
commitment to academic discourse because it represents the “free pursuit of ideas”.92 Having 
focused her analysis on the anti-Semitic and politically charged motives for denying the 
Holocaust, Mommsen’s principle suggests there is a limit to the scholarly approach to 
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countering denial with reason. Lipstadt argues that denial is the “apotheosis of irrationalism” 
and, therefore, “cannot be countered with the normal forces of investigation, argument, and 
debate” as one would normally engage in historiography.93 Rather than engaging in direct 
rebuttals of the key arguments of deniers, Denying the Holocaust took an alternative 
approach by outlining the pseudo-scholarly revisionist appearance of deniers. The analysis of 
the methodology of deniers was therefore brief, “lest it appear that I believe that serious 
consideration must be given these people’s claims.”94 Since Lipstadt was among some of the 
first scholars to produce an account of the origins of denial and its “impact on contemporary 
culture”, her work is central to understanding her method of responding to the claims of 
deniers from a historical perspective.95 
How effective, however, was Lipstadt’s historical approach in achieving her objective 
of proving that denial “was a tissue of lies with no historical standing at all”?96 This chapter 
serves as an introduction to understanding the nature of Holocaust denial, outlining the way 
in which Lipstadt challenges Holocaust denial’s ideological premises. To do this, the chapter 
is divided into three sections. Section 3.2 provides a general overview of Lipstadt’s previous 
publications to identify some key assumptions, paradigms and influences which shape 
Lipstadt’s approach to history. This lays the groundwork to discuss Lipstadt’s approach to 
Holocaust denial in her book in Section 3.3, which approaches denial from within historical 
discourse. Section 3.4 analyses Lipstadt’s approach to countering Irving’s Holocaust denial in 
particular. This chapter seeks to fill a gap in current literature which has failed to adequately 
analyse Lipstadt’s publications in any comparative form. In contrast to the methods of 
countering Holocaust denial from the trial, Lipstadt’s paradigm also reveals her approach to 
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Holocaust. Furthermore, her involvement in the Irving v. Penguin trial provides a link 
between the historical and the legal arenas.  
3.2 An Overview of Lipstadt’s Paradigm and Approach to History 
 
History, Lipstadt argues, “shapes our worldview”, it “gives you context for understanding” 
the present.97 Yet, to what extent does Lipstadt’s world-view shape her approach to 
Holocaust denial? Lipstadt’s approach to Holocaust history reveals her scholarly interests, her 
perceptions of the past and its relationship to the present. To analyse an historian’s 
interpretation of history, it is important to first identify the perspective from which they 
approach the historical material. An applicable framework can be extracted from social-
science research, which locates the paradigm or world-view of an individual, to explain the 
“basic set of beliefs that guide action.”98 In other words, you must go to the source of their 
assumptions and ideological influences to be able to accurately interpret how historians arrive 
at their conclusions. By applying Quentin Skinner’s philosophy that, “a principle makes a 
difference to the action”, Lipstadt’s principles “will need to be cited in an attempt to explain” 
her approach to denial.99  
One of the ways to interpret an historian’s world-view is to situate their work within 
the framework of epistemology and methodology, which identifies the basis for their 
knowledge and how they present and test their assumptions about the past.100 While the focus 
is primarily on Lipstadt’s approach to Holocaust deniers, it also assesses the ideological 
standpoints of Holocaust denial, as Lipstadt unpicks their underlying anti-Semitic agenda 
within her own research. Thomas Kuhn has also drawn researchers to the utility of paradigms 
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as a framework for historical research in his influential research, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.101 Kuhn assesses that a paradigm is not something you can falsify or verify but a 
summary of the key assumptions held by an individual or group.102 Lipstadt’s paradigm is 
extracted from her “text”, in order to assess the validity of her methods. In this case, 
Lipstadt's world-view naturally influences the evidence she uses to construct her argument 
and, therefore, enables an analysis of the approach she takes to that source material. The 
extent to which a scholar’s perspective, research expertise and interests can affect the 
interpretation of the evidence, and whether they allow these subjectivities to influence their 
research, becomes clearer when applying this framework of analysis. 
An historian’s paradigm is complex and multifaceted and cannot be in discussed in 
full detail here. For the purpose of this research, however, three key themes in Lipstadt’s 
paradigm help to provide a framework from which to analyse her approach to Irving’s denial. 
Based on the analysis of Lipstadt’s articles and books published between 1982 and 2017, a 
key underlying assumption held throughout is that the Holocaust is tightly connected to 
Jewish identity and memory. This paradigm also impacts on practices of Holocaust 
remembrance and collective memory and is central to Lipstadt’s approach to Holocaust 
denial.  
Lipstadt described her research on Holocaust history as an “attempt not just to shed 
light on the event itself but also to illumine the manner in which it has reverberated in 
American society and culture.”103 Therefore, Lipstadt’s approach to the Holocaust is 
interpreted within the paradigm of its impact on society today. Much of Lipstadt’s earlier 
research focused on identifying instances of anti-Semitism in American political culture and 
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in the press during World War II and in post-war American life.104 While studying and living 
in Israel in 1967-68, at the time of the Arab-Israeli War, Lipstadt recognised the “deep 
imprint of both the Holocaust and Israel on the psyche of the Jewish people.”105 Lipstadt’s 
first publication Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-
1945 (1986) argues: “had the American press and other western observers understood the 
central role of anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology, they would have been less perplexed by the 
violence” towards the Jews in the early years of the Nazi regime.106 Beyond Belief 
investigates the press as they attempted to interpret Hitler’s Nazi Germany to an American 
audience, as they witnessed the events of the Holocaust unfold. This paradigm is summarised 
in earlier articles published in Society, Jewish Social Studies and Modern Judaism, which 
criticised what could have been done by the Allies and influential religious leaders to prevent 
the deportation of the Jews.107 Notably, this research drew from a particular area of 
historiography which was influenced by the work of David Wyman and Arthur Morse in the 
late 1960s.108 
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Lipstadt’s overall argument that the American public were unwilling to act on their 
knowledge because the Holocaust seemed “beyond the bounds of credulity”, suggests an 
earlier form of Holocaust denial.109 To demonstrate this point, Beyond Belief cited various 
periodicals and newspaper reports, such as Commonweal, which published: “the situation of 
the Jews in Germany is deplorable beyond words… Don't be deceived by false denials 
concerning the persecution of the Jews under the Hitler regime.”110 Again, quoting the New 
York Times in 1933: “more shocking than the practice of Nazi terror is denial of such terror. 
Just when Hitler is saying that terror never existed.”111 When evaluating Lipstadt’s 
commitment to proving the relationship between anti-Semitism and denial later in her book 
Denying the Holocaust, Beyond Belief seems to reflect a wider assumption of Holocaust 
denial in American culture. 
Memory and remembrance of the Holocaust is a continuous theme in Lipstadt’s 
writings, focusing on the way that the Holocaust has been reported, remembered and re-
interpreted.112 Her book, The Eichmann Trial (2011) published 50 years later, portrays her 
own perceptions of the significance of this trial on the Jewish community.113 Lipstadt 
interprets Jerusalem’s events in 1961 as a “watershed moment”, stating that “the trial and the 
debate about it all served to alter dramatically how Americans would understand the 
Holocaust for decades thereafter.”114 Lipstadt’s interpretation the 1961 trial is shaped, in 
summary, by the following factors: her experience of the Irving trial, the symbolic 
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significance of Eichmann’s trial, the intentionality and role that Eichmann played in the Final 
Solution, and the power of eye-witness testimony which was brought against Eichmann 
during the trial.  
With Arendt’s controversial yet profound influence over the early scholarship on the 
Holocaust and on Eichmann’s trial, claiming that it was with “submissive meekness with 
which the Jews went to their death,” Lipstadt’s analysis of Eichmann’s intentionality and his 
commitment to Nazism, rejects Arendt’s philosophy of the “Banality of Evil.”115 Therefore, 
given Lipstadt’s commitment to preserving the memory of the Holocaust, her book refocuses 
the Eichmann trial for current scholars and reinstates its significance for bringing the 
perpetrators of the Final Solution to justice. This stance reveals aspects of Lipstadt’s 
paradigm in the way that the book unfolds in its criticism of Arendt and other previous 
“myths” of Jewish passivity.116 These examples demonstrate how Lipstadt’s focus on anti-
Semitism as a driving force for Holocaust denial, has roots in other interpretations of the 
Eichmann trial and of American responses to the Holocaust during the Second World War 
also. 
To conclude on this theme, Eichmann’s trial seems to have held a more personal 
significance on Lipstadt’s interpretation of history, and especially in connecting the 
significance of this trial to Holocaust denial trials. Lipstadt reflected that “it would take me a 
number of years to understand fully that the horrors for which Eichmann was being tried had 
sprung from the self-same anti-Semitic soil… I never dreamed that from this soil would also 
come a movement that would have a dramatic impact on the course of my own life and would 
entrap me in a complex legal battle.”117 Having examined the Eichmann trial manuscripts 
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during the course of the Irving v. Penguin trial, Lipstadt wrote: “I found myself comparing 
what I was experiencing to what had happened in Jerusalem in 1961… One of these men 
helped wiped out one-third of world Jewry. The second has dedicated himself to denying that 
truth of this.” 118 
A second assumption that can be drawn from Lipstadt’s work, is her argument that the 
Holocaust is an entirely unique event, and that comparative genocide studies are a form of 
denial, because they attempt to interpret the victims of genocide en masse. The uniqueness 
paradigm, fiercely defended by Elie Wiesel when he wrote that the Holocaust is “never to be 
comprehended”, suggests a wider paradigm of memory preservation, as anti-Semitism 
continues to manifest itself in subsequent generations.119 Nonetheless, Lipstadt echoes the 
arguments of Yehuda Bauer, that the consecration of Holocaust memory through teaching, is 
essential to remembering preserving the memory of the Holocaust.120 One aspect of this 
assumption is that the Holocaust is an entirely unique event, and cannot be compared to any 
other genocide, which has implication on the way history is taught. The Holocaust, Lipstadt 
argues, has a unique capacity to provide “ethical, moral, and political lessons” for the 
present.121 From this assumption, Lipstadt concludes that the denial of the Holocaust takes 
many forms and is not limited to revisionists who deny the gas chambers at Auschwitz or 
Hitler’s role in the Final Solution. The uniqueness paradigm, Dan Stone argues, is “a matter 
of ideology, with the sole goal of perpetuating the Holocaust as an event of sacred historical 
significance.”122 Daniel Blatman analyses that this paradigm rests on “the belief that 
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preserving the unique status of the Holocaust constitutes a sort of barrier against the growth 
and resurgence of antisemitism.”123Addressing the way that the Holocaust has been taught in 
many North-American schools, Lipstadt contested that certain historians were rejecting the 
widely-used “Facing History and Ourselves” American school history curriculum “because it 
did not present the Nazi ‘point of view’”.124 Having analysed the same critiques within the 
media and with academia regarding the deniers’ claims to presenting the “other side”, 
Lipstadt suggests that denial takes many different forms and impacts the wider issues of 
historical representation and memory within education also. 
On closer examination, representation of the Holocaust are regular themes in 
Lipstadt’s work. In her latest book, Holocaust: An American Understanding (2016), her focus 
on post-war American literature, media, and film in particular, sheds light on the response to 
the Holocaust in the 1950s and 60s. Examining the way that the Holocaust affected American 
culture, Lipstadt explains that the decision to commemorate the Holocaust in a national 
memorial, under President Carter in 1978, was a significant moment in the shaping of 
memory.125 It is evident from Lipstadt’s witness statement for the Irving v. Penguin trial, that 
memorialisation and commemoration plays a significant role in her research on the 
Holocaust. Lipstadt’s visit to a burial site at Czernowitz, the Soviet Union in 1972, which 
stated that it: “held the remains of 800 victims of the Fascists and that the victims were 
Russians, Georgians, Bukovinians, Ukrainians, etc.”, but “Jews were not mentioned.”126 
Having witnessed this “skewed” history, Lipstadt concluded that the nationalist approach of 
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the Soviet memorial indicated that Holocaust denial takes various forms; which includes the 
“white-washing” of the intended victims of the Holocaust.127  
During the process of curating the United Stated Holocaust Memorial in 1978, Elie 
Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor and scholar who served as chair on the Holocaust memorial 
commission, wrote a report on existing memorials in Eastern Europe.128 Wiesel observed in 
the New York Times Magazine that memorials in Eastern Europe:  
“refer to victims in general, of every nationality… [whereas] we speak of Jews. They mention 
all the victims of every nationality, of every religion, and they refer to them en masse. We 
object: Of course they must all be remembered, but why mix them anonymously together?… 
[Jews] alone were fated to total extermination not because of what they had said or done or 
possessed but because of what they were.”129  
Here, Wiesel echoes Lipstadt’s own fears in 1972 of the “de-Judiazing” of the Holocaust and 
memory.130 Lipstadt contends that the Holocaust was a “seminal moment in Jewish history” 
which must be “understood and remembered”, with “the highest level of scholarship” to do 
so.131  
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3.3 Deborah Lipstadt’s Approach to Holocaust Denial in Denying the Holocaust 
 
Lipstadt’s scholarly approach to Holocaust denial, reflects her commitment to defending the 
memory of the Holocaust. How then does this paradigm impact on her research on Holocaust 
denial? “My approach” to Holocaust denial, Lipstadt describes: “is akin to a scholar who 
writes about people who are flat earthers or ‘conspiracy theorists.’ That scholar would devote 
herself to trying to understand how they reach their ‘conclusions,’ assess whether they truly 
believe their arguments to be accurate and analyse the public’s reaction to them. She would 
not spend time proving the earth is round or disproving their conspiratorial claims.”132 The 
way that Lipstadt has dealt with the phenomenon of Holocaust denial, particularly in her 
book Denying the Holocaust, can be analysed by breaking down her method as follows: 
identifying anti-Semitism as the root of Holocaust denial; critiquing the methodology of 
Holocaust denial; analysing the American response to Holocaust denial, the first amendment 
and free speech; evaluating standards of scholarship; understanding the impact of Holocaust 
denial on historical memory. These categories reflect how Denying the Holocaust centred on 
revealing the deniers’ “motives for action” as Skinner suggests, using this as a basis to de-
legitimize the movement, without engaging in their debates. Arguing, therefore, that 
identifying “the threat denial poses to both the past and the future” is essential to constructing 
a method of countering their arguments.133  
The root of Holocaust denial, according to Lipstadt, lay in three areas: “antisemitism, 
corrupt deconstructionism and anti-Zionism.”134 Examining the literature produced by 
Holocaust deniers with titles such as Debunking the Genocide Myth and Did Six Million 
Really Die? The Truth at Last and, The Myth of the Six Million; the agenda to deny the 
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Holocaust was clear.135 Shermer and Grobman argue that Lipstadt’s research illuminated the 
“strong conspiratorial streak” of the claims of Holocaust deniers.136 Deniers, who had 
modelled their views on the staunchly anti-Semitic propaganda pamphlet Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion, claimed that the Jews were “conspiring” for world economic and financial 
domination.137 Stephen Eric Bronner suggests that “the Jew” became “any enemy required by 
the anti-Semite”, and thus the Protocols is reflected in denial arguments also.138 Employing 
these anti-Semitic stereotypes, deniers such as Richard Harwood asserted that “the 
‘Holocaust lie’ was perpetrated by Zionist-Jewry’s stunning propaganda machine for the 
purpose of filling the minds of Gentile people the world over with such guilt feelings about 
the Jews that they will utter no protest when the Zionists robbed the Palestinians of their 
homeland with the utmost savagery.”139 Lipstadt drew attention to George Lincoln Rockwell, 
founder of the American Nazi Party, who claimed that the Holocaust was “a monstrous and 
profitable fraud”, concluding therefore, that denial appeals to those “nurtured in the soil of 
antisemitism”.140  
Central to de-legitimising Holocaust denial claims was to ask what sources, if any, do 
deniers use to substantiate their arguments? What ideological influences do deniers bring to 
bear on these sources? Lipstadt not only focuses on the ideological roots of denial, but also 
their methodology – their reliance on evidence which has been proved to be 
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methodologically, forensically and scientifically flawed. Noting that “if you appear looking 
like a neo-Nazi, people know exactly how to categorize you”, Lipstadt suggests that deniers 
seek to gain legitimacy, therefore, by “posing as serious historians” and “historical 
revisionists” to promote denial.141 The methods of deniers “mixed truth with fiction, accurate 
with fabricated quotes, and outright lies with partially correct information” in an attempt to 
alter perceptions of the Holocaust.142 Highlighting their methods Lipstadt wrote: “whatever 
sources deniers cannot twist they ignore, particularly when they contradict their most basic 
contentions.”143  
By providing a summary of the flawed methods of denial literature, Lipstadt wrote: 
“these works demonstrate how deniers misstate, misquote, falsify statistics and falsely 
attribute conclusions to reliable sources. They rely on books that directly contradict their 
arguments, quoting in a manner that completely distorts the authors' objectives. Deniers count 
on the fact that the vast majority of readers will not have access to the documentation or 
make the effort to determine how they have falsified or misconstrued information.”144 
Therefore, Lipstadt’s research contributed to an understanding of the denial movement and 
the “direct link between the attempt to rewrite history and the attempt to push a certain 
political agenda.”145  
Having analysed the ideological methodological premises of Holocaust denial, how 
then does an academic engage with Holocaust denial from a historical perspective? How does 
Lipstadt refute denial if it is illogical and unreasonable? Lipstadt records how the academic 
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community based their response to denial on the First Amendment right to free speech, free 
enquiry and free expression.146 This has had significant impact on public perceptions of 
Holocaust denial and on Lipstadt’s approach to countering Holocaust deniers. While not fully 
endorsing a “free-speech” paradigm, Lipstadt reflects the wider values of the First 
Amendment in her scholarly efforts arguing that: “they have the right to publish their articles 
and books and hold their gatherings. But free speech does not guarantee them the right to be 
treated as the “other” side of a legitimate debate.”147 “I am not advocating the muzzling of the 
deniers. They have the right to free speech, however abhorrent. However, they are using that 
right not as a shield, as it was intended by the Constitution, but as a sword.”148 
While the centricity of a commitment to the first amendment forms part of her world-
view, Lipstadt takes a more calculated approach refuting the claims of Holocaust deniers, 
particularly after having witnessed a number of university campus newspapers print explicit 
Holocaust denial advertisements in 1993.149 Lipstadt recalls an advertisement which ran in 
the New York State University newspaper, which claimed that there is “no proof of 
homicidal gassing chambers” and that historians who challenge them, “work to suppress 
revisionist research.”150 A similar advertisement printed at Brandeis University claimed that 
the Washington Holocaust Memorial Museum was “false and manipulative”, Brandeis’ 
president argued that it would be a “violation” of the “principle of free speech” to suppress 
these ads.151 Similarly, they responded: “there are two sides to every issue” and “the issue of 
freedom of expression outweighed the issue of the offensive nature of the advertisement”; 
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thus, effectively, endorsing deniers by citing a right to free-speech.152 This demonstrates 
environment in which Lipstadt was writing her book, and one which informed her approach 
to denial also.  
The preface to Denying the Holocaust highlights the challenges that academics face 
when confronted with “the misguided notion that everyone’s view is of equal stature”.153 
Lipstadt went on to suggest that American society and academia have “created an atmosphere 
that allows Holocaust denial to flourish.”154 That denial was flourishing among academics is 
perhaps an overstatement which lacked qualification in the book. However, Lipstadt’s 
concern that deniers were gaining some credibility was argued on the basis of those who were 
promoting denial on the basis of academic tolerance and expression. Providing the notorious 
example of Noam Chomsky at MIT who had written the introduction to Robert Faurisson’s 
denial publication, seems to provide some legitimacy to this notion of academic tolerance.155 
It is from this example that Lipstadt assessed the particular danger of deniers in the academic 
field, assessing the case of Arthur Butz, a Holocaust denier and a professor at Northwestern 
University, who had expressed “the same attitude and used the same methodology that has 
characterized all Holocaust denier literature up to this point”, and had used an “aura of 
scholarly objectivity” to defend these views within academia.156 
Lipstadt’s method of dealing with Holocaust denial was, in part, a response to the 
increasing attention that deniers were receiving in the US. When Lipstadt refused a television 
producer’s request to be part of a public debate with the Holocaust denier, as an act of 
publicity for her book, the producer responded: “I certainly don’t agree with them, but don’t 
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you think our viewers should hear the other side?”157 Despite the intention to use a debate-
platform to “unmask” deniers’ views, Robert A. Kahn evaluates that when an historian faces 
“an opponent who is free to change factual positions as the situation warrants”, their attempts 
to counter denial in such a setting, would be futile.158 Lipstadt’s non-interaction with denial, 
either verbally or in print, she argues, would only “risk giving their efforts the imprimatur of 
a legitimate historical option.”159 Therefore, her method of dealing with deniers reflects her 
overall approach in Denying the Holocaust, that to engage with their debates in any depth, 
would provide “the legitimacy and a stature that they in no way deserve.”160  
“There is a critical difference between debate and analysis… It is far better to analyze who 
these people are and what it is they are trying to accomplish. Above all, it is essential to 
expose the illusion of their reasoned inquiry that conceals their extremist views. It is only 
when society comprehends this group's real intentions that we can be sure that history will not 
be reshaped to promote a variety of pernicious objectives.”161 
Through establishing standards of scholarship, Lipstadt argued that a more effective 
method in her book is “to expose the illusions of reasoned inquiry that conceals their 
extremist views.”162 Lipstadt investigated denial in America and Europe, at a time when very 
little had been written about the nature, origins and ideological roots of Holocaust denial. By 
identifying the key proponents of denial and their publications, Denying the Holocaust 
provided a timely analysis as denial literature began “entering the mainstream” of historical 
discourse in the late 1980s.163 When a denier claims to be “a real scholar”, “objective” and 
simply “revisionist” in their approach, how does an historian counter a movement that 
contradicts the historical record?164 Lipstadt’s research has implications on standards of 
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historical scholarship, particularly because Holocaust deniers’ claims to scholarly, 
professional research is overstated. Their handling of evidence can be better categorised as “a 
veneer of scholarship”, consisting of footnotes, references and formatting which appear to be 
the norm for academic writing.165 Lipstadt argues that “the historian’s role is to act as a 
neutral observer”, their interpretation is “determined by how well it accounts for the facts”, 
but “the historian brings to this enterprise his or her own values and biases.”166 Historians, 
according to Lipstadt, do not allow “personal or popular opinion to skew objective 
information”, this “is how real historians operate.”167 As a method of countering Holocaust 
denial, Lipstadt’s suggested standards of scholarship was more of a guide to de-legitimise 
their notions of scholarly objectivity. 
To what extent was Lipstadt’s approach to countering Holocaust denial effective in 
addressing these methodological errors in historical practice? When Lipstadt wrote that the 
denial of the Holocaust was an “assault on truth and memory”, she argued that denial forms 
part of a much larger phenomenon in history, which relates to the deliberate suppression of 
the facts. Truths which do not fit into the desired political or ideological paradigm of the 
individual, therefore, become problematic or “inconvenient” to their own arguments.168 
Analysing denial from the perspective of its neo-Nazi political and anti-Semitic roots 
revealed this. The Holocaust historian, David Cesarani contends that denial is like a “double 
murder” of the victims of the Holocaust because of the attempt to eradicate the history the 
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Holocaust.169 While most of her critiques of the denial movement were concerned with 
general summaries of their tactics in general, Lipstadt analysed the flaws in their writings and 
argued that denial cannot constitute acceptable scholarship. Accounts of the past are 
constructed through the selection of sources, organised into a coherent argument, and 
interpreted through the historian’s lens or paradigm. In some ways, their world-view enables 
historians to interpret the evidence which they have uncovered. In doing so, there is a process 
of creating accounts of the past which may expand on current research or may uncover new 
trajectories for further research. Lipstadt argues that “the validity of historical interpretation”:  
“Is determined by how well it accounts for the facts... Only when society – particularly that 
portion of society committed to intellectual inquiry – comprehends the full import of this 
groups intentions will there be any hope that history will not be reshaped to fit a variety of 
pernicious motives.”170  
 
Stephen C. Feinstein’s view that Denying the Holocaust serves as “a handbook for refutation” 
against the claims of Holocaust denial, is perhaps too generous an assessment from a 
historical perspective.171 The aims of the book were limited to addressing public perceptions 
of denial in the academic sphere and to narrating the origins of denial and their methods. 
There was, however, a distinct lack of examples to substantiate the generalisations made, 
despite their well-formed assertions. Gavriel D. Rosenfeld argues that Denying the Holocaust 
was not only “an exposition and refutation of Holocaust denial”, it addressed the wider issues 
of the politics of memory and “the more subtle attempts to normalize the Holocaust in 
Germany by demonstrating the fallacies of comparing it to Stalinist terror and the Armenian 
and Cambodian genocides”.172 It is this book’s broader agenda to outline the motives of 
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deniers, rather than to analyse their methods in detail, which characterises Lipstadt’s 
approach to countering Holocaust denial. 
3.4 Countering David Irving's Holocaust Denial 
Since this research investigates historical and legal approaches to countering Holocaust 
denial, focusing on the Irving v. Penguin case, it is important to turn to Lipstadt’s treatment 
of Irving in her book, which formed the basis of his libel complaint. Having analysed 
Lipstadt’s world-view, how did this influence her approach to Irving? Was Lipstadt’s 
criticism of Irving unique compared to the assessment of Irving by other historians, as 
discussed in Chapter 2? Did she approach Irving’s work from an academic historical 
perspective? As discussed above, Lipstadt’s generalised approach to Holocaust denial, 
extended to her assessment of Irving also.  
The following passages which discuss Irving in Denying the Holocaust, indicate 
Lipstadt’s focus on the “pernicious motives” of deniers, to challenge their credibility, rather 
than specifically analysing denial’s arguments.173 Irving, as an independent historian, seemed 
to pose a particular threat to history because he was a “writer of popular historical works” and 
was likely to have a platform among scholars and readers which other deniers did not have.174 
Lipstadt described Irving as an untrustworthy historian because he was someone who 
“proposed extremely controversial theories about the Holocaust.”175 Examining Irving’s 
method, she wrote: “familiar with historical evidence, he bends it until it conforms with his 
ideological leanings and political agenda”, and that “he is most facile at taking accurate 
information and shaping it to confirm his conclusions.”176 In her book, Lipstadt described 
Irving as “one of the most dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial” because he had 
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gained a reputation among scholars outside of the denial circles.177 Irving was mentioned in 
only 15 of 316 pages (Penguin, 2016 edition) and “occupied a relatively minor role” in the 
book.178 But how central was Irving to Lipstadt’s assessment of Holocaust denial? On page 
14, Lipstadt wrote that Irving was among a number of other speakers at “a world anti-Zionist 
conference” in 1992 and that those “scheduled to participate were representatives of a variety 
of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel organisations”, which associated Irving with anti-Semitic 
activity.179 On page 111, Lipstadt mentioned briefly that “David Irving, the right-wing writer 
of historical works… who had frequently proposed extremely controversial theories about the 
Holocaust, including the claim that Hitler had no knowledge of it, has become a Holocaust 
denier”.180  
Similarly, Lipstadt criticises Irving through the words of other historians and 
commentators, including Hugh Trevor-Roper when discussing his work. Stating on page 180 
that “scholars have described Irving as a ‘Hitler partisan wearing blinkers’ and have accused 
him of distorting evidence and manipulating documents to serve his own purposes”.181 
Continuing, Lipstadt notes that historians recognise and dissent to Irving “skewing 
documents and misrepresenting data in order to reach historically untenable conclusions, 
particularly those that exonerate Hitler”.182 These passages, while both general to denial and 
specific to Irving, seek to remove the academic appearance of Holocaust denial literature.  
Using Irving’s own words and statements, Lipstadt compiled her evidence from his 
speeches and publications to reveal Irving’s anti-Semitism. From suggesting that Auschwitz 
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is a commercial “tourist attraction”, to claiming that Germany’s post-war reparations were 
part of a Jewish conspiracy, Irving wrote: “nobody likes to be swindled, still less where 
considerable sums of money are involved”, Irving was echoing the age-old anti-Semitic 
trope.183 Lipstadt described him as “an ardent admirer of the Nazi leader”, who described 
himself as a “moderate-fascist” and who “seems to conceive himself as carrying on Hitler’s 
legacy”.184 Combined, these passages portray a common theme against Irving, which is best 
summarised by Lipstadt’s assessment on page 181, that “Irving is one of the most dangerous 
spokespersons for Holocaust denial. Familiar with historical evidence, he bends it until it 
conforms with his ideological leanings and political agenda”.185 While this assessment proved 
to be true, as a result of the research into Irving’s methods during the trial, it was not explored 
or qualified in any detail in Denying the Holocaust. 
Irving’s political activity, Lipstadt argued, was linked to his Holocaust denial. Noting 
that: “Irving, long considered a guru by the far right, does not limit his activities to England. 
He has been particularly active in Germany, where he has regularly participated in the annual 
meetings of the extremist German political party Deutsch Volks Union. In addition, he has 
frequently appeared at extremist sponsored rallies, meetings and beerhall gatherings. Irving’s 
self-described mission in Germany is to point ‘promising young men’ throughout the country 
in the ‘right direction.’”186 Furthermore Lipstadt sought to demonstrate the extent of the 
offence of Irving’s political anti-Semitism by explaining that Germany, Austria, Italy and 
Canada were beginning to block his entry.187 
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Lipstadt continued that Irving, “a self-described ‘moderate fascist’”, who “established 
his own right-wing political party, founded on his belief that he was meant to be a future 
leader of Britain… seems to conceive himself as carrying on Hitler's legacy.”188 Lipstadt 
identified that during Irving’s testimony at the Zündel trial, he “declared himself converted 
by Leuchter's work to Holocaust denial and to the idea that the gas chambers were a myth”, 
despite the “lack of technical expertise of the many holes that had been poked in [Leuchter’s] 
findings.”189 Irving believes that “Leuchter's testimony could provide the documentation he 
needed” to support his denial.190 Lipstadt offers some criticism of Irving’s methods here, but 
she did not go much further than to describe Irving’s endorsement of the report.  
One aspect of Lipstadt’s critique of Irving, was to outline how other historians, 
newspapers and official governments had responded to his claims to further challenge Irving 
as a professional historian in contrast to his anti-Semitic and historically inaccurate views. In 
Lipstadt’s witness statement, she suggests that while Irving’s “notoriety” as a denier was 
“quite substantial” (in 1999), this was not the case when researching deniers for the book.191 
By quoting the House of Commons’ 1989 discussion of “David Irving and Holocaust denial”, 
which labelled Irving a “Nazi propogandist and long time Hitler apologist”, Lipstadt 
contended that “one might have assumed that would have marked the end of Irving's 
reputation in England, but it did not.”192 Irving’s statement that “the whole of World War 
Two can be defined as a Holocaust”, not only undermines the uniqueness of the mass murder 
of the Jews, it attempts to absolve Nazi Germany of its crimes.193 Lipstadt drew attention to 
Irving’s subtle form of denial in his early publication, The Destruction of Dresden (1963), 
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which attempts to morally equalise the Holocaust with the casualties of the Allied bombing of 
Dresden in 1945. Lipstadt describes Irving’s methods of creating “immoral equivalencies”, as 
an attempt to absolve the crimes of the Third Reich.194  
Again, the politics of memory play a significant role in Lipstadt’s analysis of Irving 
and the receptivity of his work among scholars. Irving, according to Lipstadt, applied “a 
double standard to evidence”, and “demands ‘absolute documentary proof’” to prove Hitler’s 
responsibility in the Final Solution, “but he relies on highly circumstantial evidence” for his 
own arguments.195 Exemplifying the challenge that denial poses to altering the past, Lipstadt 
highlights how Irving’s Hitler-centric approach, appealed to German scholar, Ernst Nolte, 
who used Irving’s arguments to cast German history “in a different light.”196 Interpreting 
therefore, that Nolte had adopted Irving’s views to distort the memory of the Holocaust in a 
complex attempt to reconcile Germany with its Nazi past, Lipstadt challenges denial for its 
political dimensions. Lipstadt highlights that history is increasingly politicised, because 
adopting Holocaust denial becomes part of a process of suppressing the truth to alter the 
memory of a nation’s past.197 Brian O’Connor’s research on the Adorno trial analyses that 
this aspect of denial removes a ‘‘guilt-complex’’ which becomes “somehow disconnected 
from the events, as though there was nothing really to be guilty about”.198 Irving’s version of 
history, therefore, became pragmatic and useful to serve a political purpose for other 
sympathisers. Emphasising this aspect of Irving’s Holocaust denial is reflective of Lipstadt’s 
wider commitment to the preservation of Holocaust memory. 
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In response to her study of denial, Lipstadt’s historical approach advocates for an 
increase in educational programmes on the Holocaust to improve historical awareness. 
Education, she argues, holds “one of the keys to a defence of the truth.”199 Other methods 
which are discussed relate to promoting Holocaust museums as a means of educating the 
wider public about the Holocaust. Challenging the notion of criminalising Holocaust denial 
adopted in many European countries, Lipstadt suggests, with some foresight in 1993, that 
deniers “transform the legal arena into a historical forum, something the courtroom was never 
designed to be” and that “they transform the deniers into martyrs on the altar of freedom of 
speech.”200 The “blurring of boundaries between fact and fiction and between persecuted and 
persecutor” was, Lipstadt argued, a particular feature of Irving’s denial.201 Despite her brief 
analysis of deniers’ methods, and despite their conclusions having been discredited on a 
number of fronts, Lipstadt contends that denial still has a “fatal attraction.”202 Responding to 
Mommsen’s adjure at the beginning of this chapter, Denying the Holocaust concludes that 
“truth is far more fragile than fiction”, therefore, “reason alone cannot protect it.”203 
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3.5 Summary 
 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s insights into the nature of Holocaust denial suggests that, in 
comparison, true historians do not “attempt to write and think through history.”204 Lipstadt’s 
reflections in The Eichmann Trial echo this view, that historians’ “personal experiences 
constitute facets on the prism through which their view of the past events is refracted.”205 
Lipstadt has, in part, sought to demonstrate this by analysing denial’s ideological and anti-
Semitic roots. Her historical approach is, however, limited to the confines of the aims of her 
book. Taking a general overview of denial, the success of Lipstadt’s research lays in 
challenging the reputation of Holocaust deniers, who disguised themselves as Holocaust 
revisionists, to prove the connection between the anti-Semitic roots of Holocaust denial and 
its proponents. This chapter has sought to provide an outline of Lipstadt’s approach and 
contribution to the study of Holocaust denial, to understand the nature of Lipstadt’s scholarly 
investigation. 
In retrospect, it is Lipstadt’s response to her experiences in the Irving trial that 
indicates the intended purpose for her book and her research on Holocaust denial, which was 
not only to inform and to educate, but to preserve memory. In history, Lipstadt described her 
experience of having upheld the truth of the Holocaust as having the “privilege to do hesed 
shel emet, to stand up for those who did not survive or who could not stand up for 
themselves.”206 Thus, the personal and scholarly emphasis on denial in Lipstadt’s research, 
indicates that her approach to Holocaust history is perhaps less an objective analysis than it is 
a calculated response to the threat of denial on the preservation of memory. Conscious of the 
limitation of this chapter, Lipstadt’s paradigm and historical approach has been examined to 
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open-up lines of enquiry into her contribution to the study of Holocaust denial. New insights 
into the paradigms discussed in this chapter will become clearer with the upcoming 
publication of her book Anti-Semitism: Here and Now, which should reveal greater insights 
into Lipstadt’s historical paradigm and her interpretation of Holocaust history, through an 
American scholarly lens.207  
It should be qualified that a further analysis of Lipstadt’s overall research, therefore, 
enables researchers to understand that her approach was part of a wider historical paradigm of 
preserving the integrity of Holocaust history. Denying the Holocaust provided a 
chronological and theoretical basis to understand the origins of Holocaust denial, which 
became a key text in a growing field of research in 1993. However, as an expert in the post-
war American responses to the Holocaust, and not the Holocaust or denial itself, the book 
therefore, focused much of its analysis on the anti-Semitic nature of denial contending that 
such an ideological movement is a threat to reasoned enquiry. The methods used to counter 
denial, therefore, took a more culturally sensitive outlook, applying American values of 
freedom of expression, combined with freedom of inquiry to suggest that denial should be 
combatted through education. Lipstadt’s framing of Holocaust denial as an extreme theory 
with no historical basis limits the application of her work to historians who wish to apply 
historical methods in research to challenge deniers from a methodological perspective.  
 
For the purpose of this research, when examining methods of countering Holocaust 
denial, denial is analysed as more than a politically motivated movement, it is 
methodologically flawed. Denying the Holocaust, Evans argues, “did not pull its punches 
when it came to convicting deniers of massive falsification of historical evidence, 
                                                     
207 Deborah E. Lipstadt, Anti-Semitism: Here and Now, (New York: Schocken Books, 2019). Scheduled for  
publication 14 February 2019. 
56 
 
manipulation of facts, and denial of the truth.”208 Thus, Lipstadt’s focus on the anti-Semitic 
nature of denial provides only a partial analysis of how to counter Holocaust denial. The 
extent to which Lipstadt’s approach to refuting Holocaust denial was an effective method, is 
examined further in contrast to the legal and historical approaches adopted during the Irving 
v. Penguin trial, as analysed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The Legal Approach to Holocaust Denial: The Use of 
Historical Evidence by Barristers in a Court of Law 
 
“Only ask us to do things which move the case forward. This is not a sentimental journey.  
It’s for forensics”.     
 
       – Richard Rampton, Queen’s Counsel.209 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
When examining and comparing methods of countering Holocaust denial from the Irving v. 
Penguin trial, it is important to clarify what is meant by the defence’s legal approach. For the 
purpose of this research, the legal approach refers to the barristers’ use of historical evidence 
in court, their techniques of refuting Irving, and the legal standards of proof which operated 
within the framework of British libel law. These three aspects of the Richard Rampton’s 
approach in court are understood by investigating the defence’s legal strategy, the application 
of the legal strategy during the trial and the “standards of proof” which drove their forensic 
approach to the evidence. The “forensic” approach to Holocaust denial, as understood in this 
context, refers to the systematic methods of refuting Irving’s libel allegations with the 
documentary evidence, and the types of acceptable evidence that were used to construct the 
case.  
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To provide some legal background as to the way the defence responded to Holocaust 
denial claims, the trial of Holocaust denier Ernst Zündel is a helpful case to contextualise the 
strategy adopted by the defence to address Irving’s libel allegations. The mis-use of historical 
evidence in cases against Holocaust deniers and the danger of evidence manipulation by 
barristers in court, was characteristic of R v. Zündel in 1988. The case was fought to discredit 
reliable witnesses and to challenge the credibility of the historical record. Ernst Zündel was a 
German-born Canadian who became a “notorious” Holocaust denier and neo-Nazi 
sympathiser, distributing and printing pro-Nazi pamphlets and propaganda, including 
literature produced by Holocaust deniers such as Richard Harwood.210 It was his republishing 
of Harwood’s Did Six Million Really Die? which led to Zündel’s indictment, first in 1985 and 
again in at a re-trial 1988. Zündel was charged under the Canadian Criminal Code as having 
spread “false news”, that the content of the publication was false and that it “injured the 
public interest of racial and social tolerance”.211  
A major aspect of the Zündel trial which proved detrimental to the prosecution case, 
was that the Judge allowed the French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson to provide expert 
witness testimony for Zündel, in opposition to Raul Hilberg, considered “one of the world’s 
foremost experts” on the Holocaust.212 The symbolic significance of this court decision, as 
Lawrence Douglas argues, was that in “certifying Faurisson as an expert” it suggested that 
both he and Hilberg “defined an entirely plausible parsing of the historical record”.213 The 
impact of the Zündel trial on perceptions of legal and historical memory has attracted 
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criticism because the trial seemed to increase the academic “credentials” of deniers.214 Within 
this context, constructing a libel defence for the Irving trial was a complex process of crafting 
a suitable and ethically appropriate legal strategy, that would de-legitimise Irving’s scholarly 
reputation and prove his wilful denial of the Holocaust.  
Robert A. Kahn’s research suggests that legal approaches to countering Holocaust 
denial can be divided into two categories: “rebuttal” and “unmasking”.215 A “rebuttal” legal 
strategy will simply “defend the facticity of the Holocaust against the skeptical onslaught of 
the ‘revisionists’, responding with documentation to each attack”, which can risk “creating 
the appearance of a debate between deniers and non-deniers”.216 This strategy was 
characteristic of the Zündel trial, and is an approach which Lipstadt warns against.217 A 
second legal approach of “unmasking” the motives of Holocaust deniers “undermines” denial 
by revealing the agenda to suppress historical truth, deliberately distorting the evidence to 
serve its anti-Semitic dissemination.218 When applying Kahn’s concept of “unmasking” and 
“rebuttal” approaches to the Irving v. Penguin case it becomes clear the legal strategy did 
more than just uncover and refute Holocaust denial. An examination of the legal team’s 
forensic approach to the evidence adds a third dimension to the way that lawyers and 
barristers use evidence court.  
This chapter investigates the way that the defence barristers, Richard Rampton QC 
and Heather Rogers QC, used historical evidence in a court of law for the express purpose of 
proving that Irving was an anti-Semite and that he came to his conclusions through his 
methods of distortion and falsification of his sources. Since the Irving v. Penguin trial 
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focused on Irving’s approach to the evidence, the court’s definition of what constitutes 
legitimate evidence and its standards of proof provided the ideal test-space to examine Irving 
against the weight of historical evidence. Section 4.2 begins by outlining the defence’s legal 
strategy, to outline their methods of countering Irving. Section 4.3 evaluates the forensic 
perspective which helped to prepare and present the case in court. Section 4.4 analyses how 
Richard Rampton used evidence in court, drawing from the trial transcripts, investigating 
how the court acts as a framework which enables historical evidence to be tested and verified, 
by applying legal standards of proof. A concluding summary is outlined in section 4.5. 
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4.2 A Summary of the Defence Legal Strategy 
 
The carefully constructed legal strategy for the Irving v. Penguin trial tells us as much about 
the commitment to defending the historical record as it does about their method of countering 
Irving’s libel claims. The defence constructed their case to serve two purposes: first, that of 
proving that Lipstadt’s assessment of Irving was correct and, second, that this assessment was 
not, therefore, libellous. In order to do this the defence focused on Irving’s falsification of 
historical evidence to prove that he uses unsound historical methods. Under English libel law, 
the responsibility to rove the truth of the words expressed against Irving as the claimant is 
placed on the defendant, which is known as the “burden of proof”.219 Defending why Lipstadt 
was correct, within libel law, however, was more complex. 
Based on Irving’s Statement of Claim, the “obvious strategy”, according to Lipstadt’s 
solicitor Anthony Julius, was to “confront Irving” with the “available evidence which was 
immense at the time” and produce documents, photographs and eye witness testimony to 
prove Irving’s assessment of the Holocaust was incorrect – therefore, justifying Lipstadt’s 
assessment of Irving.220 However, Irving’s Holocaust denial depended, in part, on his 
repeated attempts to ridicule and question the reliability of survivor testimony.221 Therefore, 
his previous brazenness towards survivors raised ethical questions as to whether this was an 
appropriate approach to the case. Not only was this an ethical consideration, it was a forensic 
one also. Since Irving was acting as a litigant in person and would be representing himself 
without a legal team, he would have the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Julius 
                                                     
219 Richard J. Evans, Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust and The David Irving Trial, (New York: Basic  
Books, 2002), p.28; Deborah E. Lipstadt, History on Trial: My Day in Court With a Holocaust Denier,  
(New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), p. xx-xxii. 
220 Anthony Julius, “Denial: In Defence of Truth”, Transcript of Interview by Alex Krasodomski-Jones at  
Mishcon de Reya, www.mishcon.com/denial, (last accessed 09.02.2018), 01:18–02:20 minutes. 
221 See Irving’s response to a Holocaust survivor in Calgary Alberta, 1991: “How much money have you made  
from that piece of ink on your arm, which may indeed be real tattoo ink?”, and his speech in Tampa  
Florida 1995: “Every survivor is living proof that there was no Nazi extermination programme”; 
quoted in Richard J. Evans, Lying About Hitter, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
62 
 
argues: “why would we want to put Irving in the position where he was given the opportunity 
to consider and respond to the evidence that we were offering him and then engage with us as 
if he was one expert in controversy with another group of experts”.222 Alternatively, the legal 
strategy was directed in a way which would restrict Irving’s ability to debate the facts which 
were presented to him, and in turn would put his own work under scrutiny.  
The legal team’s carefully constructed response to the libel allegations focused on 
Irving’s anti-Semitic paradigm and his methods of writing history. Julius explains, “we 
stayed inside his castle so to speak and demonstrated what faulty foundations it was built 
on”.223 Similar to Lipstadt’s historical approach in her book, Julius explained that the defence 
would argue that “Irving (1) does not follow established historical procedures and (2) 
subordinates the truth for ideological purposes. (3) his writings and comments about the 
Holocaust are we will contend, designed to spread anti-Semitism and engender sympathy for 
the Third Reich”.224In this respect, eye-witness testimony was not sought in this case, because 
it was Irving’s historical distortions and his methodology that would be under scrutiny. The 
defence stressed that this was not a trial about whether the Holocaust happened. It was about 
whether Irving’s interpretations of the sources were accurate and reliable. This is a marked a 
departure from previous criminal trials. The legal strategy was designed so that “Lipstadt's 
allegations of manipulation and falsification could be tested” and proved true.225 
The defence sought to prove that the several instances in which Lipstadt mentioned 
Irving in her book could be taken as a single allegation which communicates a “common 
sting”.226 In other words, the defence could condense the “libellous” – that Irving is a 
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Holocaust denier – and therefore, pursue that line of argument throughout.227 The demands of 
a libel trial, as Duncan and Neill outline in their summary of defamation law, only require the 
defence to prove that the words were “substantially true”.228 Summarising this unique aspect 
of English libel law, Judge Gray wrote that: “the more serious the allegation the less likely it 
is that the event occurred and hence the stronger should be the evidence before the court”.229 
This standard would be used to determine “if the truth of the defamatory imputations made 
against Irving has been established”.230 Thus, Lipstadt did not have to prove that every 
allegation was correct in her book, but that the inference that Irving is a Holocaust denier was 
a true assessment.231 The legal team were, therefore, careful to construct their case to be as 
“air-tight” as possible, in order to avoid a repetition of the Zündel trial and remove the 
possibility for Irving to debate the Holocaust. As the trial progressed, Irving’s repeated 
attempts to challenge and question the evidence presented to him was met by an equally 
determined, yet decidedly more skilful defence barrister, whose rebuttals were focused and 
effective. Approaching the denial claims from a legal mind-set, Rampton reminded Irving 
that “you have entered the arena” and therefore, “my job is about undermining your 
position by reference to what you should have looked at”.232 
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4.3 A Forensic Legal Approach: Preparing and Presenting the Case 
 
A forensic approach to historical evidence takes two forms. First it relates to an unemotional 
use of documentary evidence to construct their case, often employing very technical data in 
the form of expert reports. Second, the term “forensic” can also describe the legal method 
which is by nature systematic and stream-lined to the exact specifications of the libel case. 
Analysing the barrister’s legal approach in Irving v. Penguin from this dual perspective 
highlights the differences between history and law that the case was “not a sentimental 
journey”, but one which sought to separate memory from facts.233 In 1999, Rampton, Rogers 
and Penguin’s solicitors Mark Bateman (Davenport Lyons) and Veronica Byrne (Mishcon de 
Reya) visited Auschwitz-Birkenau and the archive with Lipstadt and Van Pelt, to examine the 
documentary evidence for the gas chambers which formed much of Van Pelt’s report.234 That 
legal standards of proof differ from the historian, Lipstadt contrasted her own perceptions of 
the preparation for the case in History on Trial: 
“‘Isn’t it time trustworthy experts did an extensive scientific study of this place?’ I was 
stunned by Rampton’s apparent conviction that we needed a scientific study to ‘prove’ the gas 
chambers were killing factories. Unable to contain myself, I burst out, ‘why do we need 
scientific studies? We have the evidence’”.235  
Not only does this indicate that the defence were concerned with forensic and scientific 
analysis of Auschwitz, it suggests that the law places significant value on the ability to prove 
beyond doubt, especially when confronted with Irving’s denial of the historical evidence.  
A second aspect of the legal “forensic” approach to Irving’s denial during the trial 
was how it synthesised the mass of historical documents and expert reports into a stream-
lined and organised legal strategy. The defence’s reliance on documentary evidence, rather 
than witness testimony, demonstrates that the forensic legal approach uses “standards of 
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proof” to test the reliability of the evidence they present in court. When Rampton stated to the 
court: “I prefer the original documents” to work with because there may be aspects of 
testimony which are “mistrustful” and are difficult to prove against the historical evidence.236 
Furthermore, Rampton used various methods of preparing for the case, including legal 
interrogatories, which lay out the written cross-examination of Irving. Rampton’s preparation 
consisted of lists of historical sources and evidence he could refer to, to refute each denial 
argument. Van Pelt records that these interrogatories were made up of around 113 questions, 
over 100 focused on Irving’s reliance on the methodologically un-sound 1988 Leuchter 
Report.237 Rampton’s questions were based on the historian’s expert reports, particularly of 
Van Pelt, which shaped the examination of Irving’s “evidence”.  
The legal approach was stream-lined to countering Irving’s denial to address the main 
issues of Irving’s libel claims, by focusing on three or four key areas of his Holocaust denial. 
Since the expert reports provided far more evidence than the court could analyse in the 33-
day trial, Rampton and Rogers’ preparation for the case was selected to serve a legal purpose. 
Conscious of the constraints of the court to deal with the vast amounts of historical material, 
Rampton aptly summarises their legal approach to Irving during the trial:  
“MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Looking at Kristallnacht, not the aftermath of Kristallnacht, there 
are several points made in Evans and Longerich, I think, which I do 
not think you cross-examine too specifically… but does that mean 
they have gone out of the case, or what?  
MR RAMPTON:  It is very difficult. I am very conscious of the amount of time that 
this case could take. That means I am also conscious of the amount 
of money it could cost my clients, never mind court time and the 
time of all the people involved. I have taken the view, right or 
wrong, that, if I have three or four, or maybe two or three, or even 
five or six, dead cert winners, to use a colloquialism, in any 
particular topic, I am not going to spend a lot of time having argy-
bargy about minor points with Mr Irving”.238 
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4.4 The Use of Evidence by Barristers in Court 
 
Consider, therefore, how Rampton processed the evidence produced by the expert witnesses 
into a format which could be used for his oral defence in court. It is essential to turn briefly to 
analyse the methods and the presentation of the case, to examine the legal approach and the 
forensic strategy in practice. Choosing to examine Irving by taking him through the 
documents in chronological order, Evans argues, “built up a narrative of Nazi anti-Semitism 
that was designed to trap Irving in the logic of historical events.”239 In analysing Rampton’s 
cross-examination of Irving, the legal approach to countering Holocaust denial focused on 
proving three key elements. First, to prove intent, that Irving was conscious of the historical 
record when he denied the Holocaust. Second, the defence were to prove that his falsified 
history was ideologically driven, motivated by his commitment to Hitler and his anti-
Semitism. Third, to prove Irving’s distortions, by providing multiple examples of his 
misquotation, mistranslation and other systematic errors which would prove he manipulated 
sources to fit his agenda. As Judge Gray outlined in his judgment, it was the responsibility of 
the defence to “establish that the misrepresentation by Irving of the historical record was 
deliberate in the sense that Irving was motivated by a desire borne of his own ideological 
beliefs to present Hitler in a favourable light”.240 The defence therefore would prove that his 
errors were not innocent “mistake[s] or misapprehension” but deliberate falsification.241  
First, to prove intent, Rampton demonstrated that Irving consciously deviated from 
the historical record to serve a political purpose. The defence therefore responded to Judge 
Gray’s assessment that “if the charge of misrepresentation and falsification of the historical 
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evidence is substantially made out, there remains the question whether it was deliberate”.242 
To demonstrate Irving’s intent, Rampton drew the court’s attention to Irving’s speech in 
Calgary, Alberta in September 1991, in which Irving proclaimed that: 
“Until 1988, I believed that [there] had been something like a Holocaust. I believed that 
millions of people had been killed in factories of death. I believed in the gas chamber. I 
believed in all the paraphernalia of the modern Holocaust… But [in] 1988, when I came to 
Canada and gave evidence in the trial of Ernst Zündel as an historian, I met there people who 
knew differently and could prove to me that the story was just a legend”.243 
Rampton, paraphrasing the findings of the Leuchter report, suggested that Irving adopted the 
view that the “‘gas chambers’ could never have been gas chambers, because, according to 
Leuchter, the concentration of hydrogen cyanide needed to kill humans was higher than that 
needed to kill lice”.244 This uncritical adoption of Leuchter’s findings proved to be symptomatic 
of Irving’s wider distortions. 
In the preparation for the case, the barristers outlined the centrality of the Leuchter 
report to Irving’s denial of the use of gas chambers at Auschwitz to kill the Jews. In the 
“Defendant’s Statement of Case”, Rogers summarised Van Pelt’s conclusions: “that the 
Leuchter Report did not constitute evidence (still, less compelling evidence)” and that Irving 
“was full aware of the fact that the Leuchter Report did not constitute proper evidence. His 
decision to rely upon it to support his ‘conversion’ to the view that there were no homicidal 
gas chambers in Auschwitz was not the act of an historian or scholar, but demonstrates his 
commitment to the cause of Holocaust denial”.245 Irving’s conscious and public “conversion” 
to Holocaust denial through the methodologically and scientifically flawed Leuchter Report, 
indicates his intent to utilise documents to suit his agenda, despite any historical or scientific 
validity.246 As Van Pelt highlights, Judge Gray would be conscious that “as a historian, Irving 
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could be held accountable not only for what he had considered but also for what he ought to 
have considered” as evidence to support his views.247 Thus, Irving’s intentional use of the 
falsified and invalid findings of Leuchter’s Report, contradicted the majority of historical 
evidence. 
Second, to prove ideological motivations and, therefore, the relationship between 
Irving’s anti-Semitism and his Holocaust denial, the defence worked within a general 
framework of Irving’s racism. The strategic legal approach sought to draw attention away 
from Lipstadt’s allegations of Irving’s anti-Semitism, to widen the scope to his neo-Nazi 
associations. This was to demonstrate that his views were not just controversial, but they 
were motivated by a racialised world-view. Irving’s racism, the defence proved, was the 
paradigm from which he operated. Drawing the connection between members of neo-Nazi 
organisations and their anti-Semitism, Rampton cross-examined Hajo Funke on his report, 
asking: “do any of these neo-Nazi individuals, or groups of individuals, have a policy which 
is Nazi, but not anti-Semitic and anti-foreigner?”248 Funke assured Rampton that, based on 
his research, “not any person in any situation” involved in the neo-Nazi organisations in 
Germany, could be “distanced from that kind of rhetoric, agitation, ideology” which share 
this “same world view”.249 Effectively, the defence questioned, can a racist historian 
objectively write about history without their paradigm affecting their interpretation of the 
evidence? At the same time as presenting Irving’s racism before the court, the defence asked: 
“what is your task as an historian, Mr Irving? It is, is it not to give an objective, fair, 
interpretation to the cumulative effect of all the evidence”?250 
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To provide some examples from the trial, Rampton spent considerable time 
examining Irving’s National Alliance speeches, interviews with journalists, lectures and 
private diary entries and correspondence which would demonstrate Irving’s overt racism. In a 
speech given at a London Clarendon Club in 1990, Irving proclaimed that the MP Lord 
Hailsham was “traitor No.1 to the British cause” because of his positive views on 
immigration, going on to speak of “cleaning up our own homeland again” to return to a “true-
blooded” nation.251 Irving insisted that that these views were his “patriotism” for the old 
Britain.252 In the same speech, he claimed that “every single defendant in the Guinness Shares 
Scandal was of a certain, uh, type”, which was met with “applause” and “laughter”, appealing 
to the anti-Semitic sympathies of his audience.253 When the defence picked up on Irving’s 
views that he felt “queasy” about black Englishmen playing on the national cricket team, he 
would respond to these allegations of racism with: “I employ ethnic minorities without the 
slightest hesitation”.254 Irving’s anti-Semitism, it was argued by the defence, was part of his 
wider racist paradigm which significantly impaired Irving’s objectivity as an historian. By 
casting the net wider to include Irving’s speeches, interviews and diary entries, Lipstadt’s 
assessment of Irving, that his denial was influenced by his association with right-wing 
extremists, was put into greater context. This tactical approach to Irving’s Holocaust denial, 
“deflected attention away from Lipstadt's credentials and her defamatory remarks, and toward 
Irving’s supposed extremism and fraudulent activities”.255 
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The following example from Day 12 of the trial, highlights the defence’s treatment of 
Irving’s evidence and their legal strategy in practice. Reiterating his claims of “aggravated 
libel”, Irving sought to establish his claim that Lipstadt and Penguin were both party to a 
“broader endeavour” to ruin Irving’s reputation and that he had been “the victim of 
an international endeavour to destroy [his] legitimacy as an historian”.256 Before Irving could 
finish his complaints, Judge Gray responded “let us see how the evidence turns out”.257  
On Day 12, an evolutionary psychologist was called as a witness to buttress Irving’s 
claim of a Jewish international conspiracy; which magnified Irving’s anti-Semitism to the 
court. Kevin MacDonald, a proponent of questionable theories on Jewish community 
behaviour, claimed that evolutionary psychology proves that “Judaism developed a conscious 
program of eugenics to improve scholarly ability”.258 Describing his work as focusing on “the 
segregation of the Jewish gene pool from surrounding peoples, resource competition between 
groups, and so on”, MacDonald’s highly anti-Semitic and stereotypical projections on the 
Jews, are also seen in his books Separation and its Discontents and A People That Shall 
Dwell Alone.259 MacDonald’s role was to testify for Irving, to try to “prove” that “the tactics 
Jewish organisations use to combat anti-Semitism” were actively trying to “suppress” 
Irving’s work.260 By examining McDonald, a professed academic, Irving sought to buttress 
his reputation and his claim to have been a victim of a Jewish conspiracy: 
“PROFESSOR KEVIN MCDONALD:  … obviously, they view you as a danger because of  
your intellectual — because of your writings. 
MR IRVING:     But a danger to what? 
PROFESSOR KEVIN MCDONALD:  I believe they think it is a danger to their, what they view as  
an important, that their version of events be accepted as the 
truth, and that the dissent from certain of these tenets should 
be viewed as beyond the pale of rational discussion. 
                                                     
256 HCJ/ QB Irving v. Penguin, Day 12, Monday 31 January 2000, p.7 line 5, p. 6 lines 21-23. 
257 Ibid, p. 7. Line 8.  
258 Kevin MacDonald, “Shuelvitz’ Yellow Journalism”, Culturebox, Slate Magazine, 27 January 2000, quoted  
in, Deborah E. Lipstadt, History on Trial: My Day in Court With a Holocaust Denier, (New York:  
Harper Perennial, 2006), pp. 151–152. 
259 HCJ/ QB Irving v. Penguin, Day 12, Monday 31 January 2000, pp. 8-9. 
260 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
71 
 
MR IRVING:  Finally, in order to pre-empt a question Mr Rampton may 
wish to ask, do you consider me to be an anti-Semite from 
your knowledge of me? 
PROFESSOR KEVIN MCDONALD:  I do not consider you to be an anti-Semite.”261 
This exchange, therefore, demonstrated to the Judge Gray and to Rampton that Irving’s 
reliance on “scholars” who had equally unsubstantiated theories regarding the Jews and was a 
demonstration of Irving’s unscholarly approach and his anti-Semitism.  
In analysing the way that the defence dealt with Irving’s witnesses (the two historians, 
Sir John Keegan and Professor Watt, and the “psychologist” Professor Kevin MacDonald), 
Judge Gray noted in his judgment that “there was no cross-examination by the Defendants’ 
counsel of any of these witnesses”.262 Rampton’s dismissal of Irving’s witnesses MacDonald, 
Keegan and Watt with “I have no questions” was a calculated response which demonstrates 
the defence’s legal strategy to not engage in a debate with Irving’s views or the witnesses 
who defended his cause.263 This strategy first demonstrated to the Judge that there was 
nothing more Rampton needed to add, Irving had made his views clear to the judge in his 
own words, which only demonstrated that his case was weak. Second, to engage with 
MacDonald’s anti-Semitic theories and comments would suggest that his work had some 
academic worth. To ignore them, Lipstadt suggests, was “the optimum forensic tactic”.264 To 
demonstrate MacDonald’s inability to prove Irving’s case, Judge Gray concluded “the 
assistance which I derived from his evidence was limited”.265 
Since Judge Gray was the intended “audience” of the legal cross-examination, 
Rampton did not always respond to Irving if he made a particularly insidious claim. As long 
as the judge heard Irving’s own words and could make a logical inference as to his intent, his 
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anti-Semitic and ideological views, or his manipulating the historical documents, then 
Rampton would respond with silence, indicating that this matter has been adequately proved 
in the court and did not need to be pushed further. Therefore, the court provided a legal 
framework to challenge Irving, as far as needed, to prove their case to the Judge. A by-
product of Rampton’s examination of Irving’s intent, ideology and distortions, was to 
demonstrate his flawed methodology and un-scholarly approach, to delegitimise him as an 
historian. Irving attempted to justify the Leuchter Report’s findings, arguing that the “videos 
tapes” of Leuchter conducting his illegal research at Auschwitz, “provide compelling visual 
evidence of the scrupulous methods” used.266 Yet, it was the success of the defence’s strategy 
to focus on his methods of research which enabled the court to discern what Irving 
considered compelling historical evidence.  
Third, to prove Irving’s distortions and manipulations, Rampton drew attention to 
multiple examples to demonstrate Irving’s work had deliberately altered the historical record. 
In the opening statement for the defence on 11 January, Rampton began: “my Lord, Mr. 
Irving calls himself an historian. The truth is, however, that he is not an historian at all but a 
falsifier of history. To put it bluntly, he is a liar.”267 Continuing, Rampton summarised their 
findings: “lies may take various forms and may as often consist of suppression or omission as 
a direct falsehood or invention, but in the end all forms of lying converge into a single 
definition, wilful, deliberate misstatement of the facts.”268 Judge Gray concluded that Irving 
indicated intentional “mistranslation in order to exculpate Hitler”, based on the examination 
of the two editions of Hitler’s War in 1977 and 1991, which kept the mistranslations.269 
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Rampton examined one aspect of Irving’s flawed methods on Day 8 of the trial. 
Irving had based his conclusions on survivor testimony from a single Nuremberg eye-witness 
account of Marie Vaillant-Couturier. The presiding Judge Biddle had expressed doubt on one 
aspect of her testimony regarding camp prostitution at Birkenau.270 Irving changed Biddle’s 
words from “this I doubt”, to “all this I doubt”, to try to prove that Biddle cast doubt on all 
eye-witness testimony regarding the conditions of the concentration camps.271 This deliberate 
misquotation of Judge Biddle’s assessment of one aspect of Vaillant-Couturier’s testimony 
was a deliberate attempt to alter the evidence to suit his particular historical position. When 
asked to explain his distortions, Irving suggested that he “added the word “all” to make it 
more literate for an audience”, which again sought to divert attention and rationalise his 
distortions.272 
“MR JUSTICE GRAY:  Can I just ask because I am not quite sure that I am following this? 
You interpret those three words in parenthesis, appearing where 
they do in the summary of this lady’s evidence, as the judge casting 
doubt over the totality of it?”  
MR IRVING:   Up to that point, yes”. 
MR RAMPTON:  Mr Irving, you know perfectly well, do you not, that you have done 
what you have so often done? You have taken one little phrase 
which is applied to one proposition made by the witness…”273 
Again, Rampton provided evidence of Irving’s pattern of removing passages of text 
from eye-witness testimony to produce very different versions of events in his cross-
examination of Irving’s “interpretation” of the 1923 Nazi Putsch. The defence found 
“significant discrepancies” between the eye-witness and documentary evidence and Irving’s 
account of the 1923 Putsch.274 As quoted in Irving’s biography of Hermann Göring, Irving 
claimed that Hitler, after “learning that one Nazi squad had ransacked a kosher grocery store 
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during the night, he sent for the ex-army lieutenant who had led the raid [and] dismissed him 
from the party on the spot”.275 Irving’s selective wording, failed to mention that the lieutenant 
was in fact dismissed because he was not wearing the Nazi Party emblem, not because of his 
action of raiding a Jewish shop.276 As Evans argues, Irving “tried to distance Hitler from all 
forms of violence against the Jews” in an attempt to cast Hitler in a “more favourable light 
than the document actually allows”.277 This exclusion of information left the reader with the 
impression that Hitler was discouraging acts of violence against the Jews. During Rampton’s 
cross-examination, Irving excused himself by claiming “that was author’s licence”, and that 
sometimes you have to “help the reader along”.278 To demonstrate the gravitas of these 
distortions, Rampton responded that this was an “illegitimate licence… with a record of 
history” and cannot be used to re-write events to favour your argument.279  
Another method of distortion was Irving’s mistranslation of German words into 
English, to suit his Holocaust denial claims. Since Irving was fluent in German, he could not 
fall back on the notion that this was a mere mistake in translation; the distortions were 
deliberate. Rampton responded to Irving’s repeated attempts to rearrange the evidence: “no, 
Mr Irving… you were concerned that if left unvarnished… what Hitler said would appear to 
be fairly conclusive evidence that he intended the physical annihilation of the Jews.”280 
Defending his choice of wording, Irving responded by employing the relativist argument, 
“how would you decide what is the faithful rendering of a particular word in translation” 
anyway?281 In order to demonstrate Irving’s repeated historical malpractice, Rampton’s 
questioning followed the logic that “an honest, upright, careful, meticulous, open minded 
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historian” would not wilfully and consciously distort documents from their original.282 
Rampton argued that “it is not because we are not concerned in this court with proving or 
disproving what happened in Auschwitz. We are concerned with your state of mind”.283 In 
other words Irving’s “standards” of truth were contradictory to the historical record. 
On the final day of the trial (15 March 2000) Rampton closed his analysis of Irving by 
reiterating the “compelling” breadth of documentation on Hitler and his role in the Final 
Solution, which was presented by Dr Longerich and the expert reports. All of the evidence 
presented against Irving, “fairly read by an open-minded, careful historian, plainly 
implicate[s] Hitler”.284 Longerich concluded: “it takes only a moment’s light reflection to 
realize that the contrary idea is both absurd and perverse” to endorse as a reliable historian.285  
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4.5 Summary 
While a select choice of evidence was used to target specific claims made by Irving, Rampton 
and Rogers’ analysis was extensive, thorough and insurmountable. Analysing Irving’s work, 
they anticipated his responses and prepared accordingly. The defence team were equipped to 
target each methodological and historical flaw in Irving’s work by holding him accountable 
to the historical record. The legal approach, therefore, focused on drawing out the deliberate 
methodological errors in Irving’s work. Summarising his approach to the case in the 
Judgment, Mr Justice Gray wrote: 
“My task is to arrive, without over-elaborate analysis, at the meaning or meanings which the 
notional typical reader of the publication in question, reading the book in ordinary 
circumstances, would have understood the words complained of, in their context, to bear. 
Such a reader is to be presumed to be fair-minded and not prone to jumping to conclusions but 
to be capable of a certain amount of loose thinking”.286 
Thus, Rampton’s forensic approach to the documentary evidence, particularly when viewed 
in contrast to Lipstadt’s approach, proved to be a vital component to countering Irving’s 
Holocaust denial. This forensic approach to the defence’s legal strategy was successful in 
clarifying Irving’s motives and his methods. The final judgment assessed the defence’s plea 
of justification, and concluded, in a much more condemnatory assessment of Irving than 
Lipstadt or any historian previously, that:  
“Irving has for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and 
manipulated historical evidence; that for the same reasons he has portrayed Hitler in an 
unwarrantedly favourable light, principally in relation to his attitude towards and 
responsibility for the treatment of the Jews; that he is an active Holocaust denier; that he is 
anti-semitic and racist and that he associates with right wing extremists who promote neo-
Nazism. In my judgment the charges against Irving which have been proved to be true are of 
sufficient gravity for it be clear that the failure to prove the truth of the matters set out in 
paragraph”.287 
It is this legal mindset of distinguishing between true and false uses of historical evidence 
which proved most effective in countering Irving. The conceptual legal framework, which 
took a forensic and systematic approach to assessing Irving’s arguments, was a significant 
point of departure from previous historical analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Historian as an Expert Witness: Applying 
Historical and Legal Methods 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Historians are witnesses to the past. Their reliability as witnesses, however, depends on their 
use of verifiable documentary evidence to account for the past. This is a useful comparison 
between historical practice and the legal arena, which raises the question, to what extent does 
an historian already act as a witness. During the Eichmann trial proceedings in 1961, the 
American historian Salo Baron was commissioned as an expert witness to provide the 
historical context of the Nazi regime to the court.288 He declared: “I appear here as a witness, 
not an eye-witness or a jurist, but as a historian.”289 Baron continued: “It is known that a 
historian who studies contemporary history is always confronted with a double problem. The 
first problem is: does one already have a historical perspective? … The second problem is: 
does one have documents?”290 In this sense, the historian as an expert witness faces the same 
challenges as they do when they write history for academic purposes: albeit for a different 
audience. In a legal setting, however, historians are not only accountable to the judge for the 
quality of their reports, they are under oath to defend the truth of their claims. The challenge, 
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therefore, to produce material that is historically accurate, conforms to the demands of the 
court and is useful to the defence’s legal strategy, poses an unusual situation for the historian.  
This chapter assesses the expert reports of historians Robert Jan Van Pelt, Christopher 
Browning Peter Longerich and Richard Evans and also briefly the report of political scientist 
Hajo Funke. Their reports demonstrate the need for the historian to produce verifiable 
evidence in written form, which at times, incorporate a legal and historical approach to 
countering Holocaust denial. The historians’ contribution to the defence by producing both 
forensic and historiographical analysis in their expert reports, indicates the utility of the 
historian in cases against Holocaust deniers. There are grounds, based on the Irving v. 
Penguin trial, to suggest that historians acting in a legal capacity are especially fruitful in 
uncovering new documents which significantly contribute to a wider knowledge of Holocaust 
history. While this should not set a precedent to encourage historians to seek out 
opportunities to act in a legal setting, Browning suggests that when trials such as Irving v. 
Penguin arise, historians ought to “lend their expertise to enable the courts to reach informed 
verdicts”, where possible.291 The uniqueness of the role of the expert witness in Irving v. 
Penguin, was that it provided an arena for historians to challenge denial within the 
framework of the law and to utilise certain standards of proof to sharpen their historical 
analysis. It is through an examination of these expert reports that standards of scholarship are 
clarified. 
Furthermore, this chapter argues that the expert reports were vital to the success of the 
case – and vindicate not only historical practice, but the ability for historians to reach a 
truthful account of the past. Wendie Ellen Schneider’s analysis of the “conscientious 
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historian” is examined through the case study of the Irving v. Penguin trial.292 This chapter is 
subdivided into three sections. Section 5.2 examines the role of historians as expert witnesses 
in the Irving v. Penguin trial. Section 5.3 analyses the expert reports, their approach to 
historical evidence and their key findings. It investigates how the reports clarified standards 
of historical scholarship as a result of the experts’ historical research. Section 5.4 assesses the 
significance of the expert witness in a legal setting and the application of their research to 
methods of countering denial.  
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5.2 The Role of the Historian as an Expert Witness in the Irving v. Penguin Trial 
The principles of English law suggest that “an expert witness should provide independent 
assistance to the court by way of objective, unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his 
expertise.”293 The role of an expert witness can vary; however, their contribution to the court 
usually lends itself to one or more of the following: 
“(a) assist a party to establish the facts and to assess the merits of a case and with its 
preparation; (b) give the court, as evidence, their expert opinion…; (c) give factual evidence 
on a subject, where, because of their expertise, their evidence will have greater weight than 
that of an unqualified witness… as to measurements they have made or examinations which 
they have carried out; (d) conduct enquiries on behalf of the court and report to the court as to 
their findings”.294 
Applying these generally to the Irving v. Penguin case, the five expert witnesses, one of 
whom was a non-historian, were chosen to present their reports in court. They demonstrated 
their expertise by establishing (a) “the facts” of history, clarifying the evidence, (b) providing 
“expert opinion” on Irving’s use of historical documents, (c) giving “factual evidence” to 
counter his claims, and (d) producing an extensive “report to the court as to their findings”. 
The commission of expert witnesses in Irving v. Penguin, four of whom were 
historians, depended entirely on the nature of the libel action. The defence’s legal strategy, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, opted to challenge Irving’s claim for libel by proving his flawed 
historical methodology and ideology. Therefore, employing witnesses whose professional 
careers centred on knowledge of Hitler’s role in the Final Solution, the gas chambers at 
Auschwitz, the centrality of anti-Semitism in Nazi policy and historical practice, would 
provide the legal defence with the necessary expertise to combat Irving’s denial in court.  
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Combined, the expert witnesses were chosen to provide their expertise to the court, as 
part of a “three-pronged” defence strategy.295 The first responsibility for the expert witness, 
was to compile the available evidence to prove that Irving was a Holocaust denier. Thus, the 
political scientist Hajo Funke, from the Free University of Berlin, was commissioned to write 
a report on Irving’s anti-Semitic associations and his receptivity in Germany, so as to analyse 
the ideological roots of his Holocaust denial. It is worth outlining Hajo Funke’s contribution 
to the defence. He served as a “non-historian” expert witness and provided evidence of 
Irving’s association with right-wing groups. The political perspective substantiated the 
defence to prove that Irving was a Holocaust denier, therefore neutralising Irving’s libel 
claims.296 As a political scientist, Funke’s expert evidence provided further proof of the 
connection between ideological extremism and the denial of the Holocaust. Furthermore, the 
report’s findings converged with Lipstadt’s historical perspective from her book Denying the 
Holocaust, indicating the ability for scholars to reach reliable conclusions based on the 
evidence, despite approaching the material from different disciplinary perspectives.  
Few historians or commentators on the trial have analysed Funke’s report in any 
detail. Despite his testimony forming a smaller part of the trial, his conclusions were 
nevertheless central to the defence’s proof of justification. Following a similar line to 
Lipstadt, Funke proved the connection between Irving’s Holocaust denial and his anti-
Semitism and right-wing associations to suggest that “the alliance” with the RWE in 
Germany “accorded wholly with Irving’s political tastes. Far from performing a passive 
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function… Irving, like the message of denial he preached, was a catalyst” for political 
extremism.297  
A second aspect of the defence was to analyse the mass of primary documents on the 
Holocaust, particularly on Hitler, the Final Solution and the gas chambers at Auschwitz, 
which provides the epistemological “basis for historical knowledge” on the Holocaust.298 
Robert Jan Van Pelt, a professor of architectural history at the University of Waterloo, an 
expert on the architectural evidence of Auschwitz and the gas chambers was commissioned to 
address Irving’ reliance on the Leuchter Report to deny the existence of homicidal gas 
chambers at Auschwitz.299 Peter Longerich, a German Professor of Holocaust history from 
Royal Holloway University of London, was to produce two expert reports, one on the 
systematic and centralised nature of Nazi policy towards the Jews, and the second on Hitler’s 
role in the Final Solution.300 Peter Longerich, acted as a specialist in “the Nazi Dictatorship, 
its structure, its origins and its legacy”.301 Commissioned by the defence solicitors, Mishcon 
de Reya, Longerich was to provide expert testimony for the defence on Hitler’s role in the 
Nazi persecution of the Jews and to prove the systematic and centralised nature of the Final 
Solution.302 
 In a similar vein, the American professor Christopher Browning, of the University of 
North Carolina – Chapel Hill, provided expertise on the implementation of the Final Solution 
and the centrality of anti-Semitism in Nazi policy. Browning, whose work centres on the 
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Final Solution, had testified in six previous Holocaust-related trials and was the most 
experienced in providing expert witness in a court of law.303 Browning identified that his role 
was “to provide the court with historical background information on the nature of Nazi 
policies and occupation authorities in order to help it understand and assess the credibility of 
eye-witness testimony”.304 Not dissimilar to the evidence provided for the Irving v. Penguin 
trial, Browning’s specific task was to examine the documentary evidence for the 
implementation of the Final Solution and the outworking of Nazi policy towards the Jews.305 
Addressing areas of Irving’s work which denied the systematic and centralised nature of the 
Final Solution, Browning investigated the evidence and purpose of the Wannsee Conference 
and “Operation Reinhard” to counter Irving’s denial.306 
Finally, comprising the third prong of the defence, Richard Evans, the Cambridge 
University professor of History, was commissioned as lead expert witness, to analyse Irving 
as an historian: his methodology and his sources. Evans’ report would form the documentary 
basis for the defence against Irving. Evans was instructed by both Mishcon de Reya and 
Davenport Lyons as the lead historical witness whose role was to examine the reliability of 
Irving as an historian.307 Competent in the German language and an expert in modern 
German history, Evans was also selected because of his research on historical objectivity, the 
role of the historian and his research on the influence of ideology on writing history, which 
Julius suggested was indispensable for this case.308 Evans’ report was central to the defence 
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because his analysis of Irving’s methods would either justify or reject Irving’s claim to being 
a reputable historian.  
What contribution did these historians make to the legal defence against Irving? The 
London-based defence solicitors, Mishcon de Reya, wrote to Van Pelt in 1998 outlining the 
expected outcome of employing his expertise as follows: “you will be submitting a report on 
the gas chambers and exterminations at Auschwitz which will show that what Irving says 
about the camps in this respect is untrue”.309 These specific aims of the defence, directed Van 
Pelt’s report, who specialises in the forensic evidence for Auschwitz, to combat Irving’s more 
notorious claims that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz.310 Reflecting on his 
involvement in the case, Van Pelt identified that his role was to “write an expert opinion that 
was to present and analyse the evidence of Auschwitz as an extermination camp qua 
evidence”.311 From their expertise, Rampton and Rogers would then “distil” their findings 
into a coherent “case to be presented in court”.312 
Aimed at specifically addressing Irving’s claims on history, the reports were 
structured to present the breadth of historical evidence on the major issues which Irving 
contradicts, providing the necessary context for the judge to asses Irving’s claims. In this 
sense, Browning’s examination of the documentation of the Nazi policy towards the Jews and 
Van Pelt’s architectural evidence of the Auschwitz-Birkenau and the gas chambers, directly 
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refuted denial by simply presenting the evidence for the Holocaust. Kahn’s concept of a legal 
“rebuttal” can be similarly applied to the expert report’s historical approach.313 
Criticism of historians as expert witnesses often centres on how an historian can 
separate “factual evidence” from “opinion evidence” when employing their expertise to a 
legal setting. Roderick Munday’s general assessment of the forensic expert witness raises the 
issue that expert witnesses “must confine their results and their report to facts only”, which 
“assumes that a crisp distinction can be drawn between fact and opinion”.314 Since historians 
offer both factual and opinion evidence, in the form of interpretation and explanation of the 
documents in their wider context, this process of separation is more complex when appearing 
in court. Evans argues that historians tend to offer “varying degrees of certainty” based on the 
available evidence and “yet the law demands clear-cut, definite, and unambiguous statements 
of a kind with which historians often feel uncomfortable”.315 The role of the historian as an 
expert witness in this libel trial therefore challenges the concept of the objective historian and 
asks whether the legal framework demanded a more forensic approach to historical research. 
If this is the case, how does this affect our understanding of the historian and their research 
practices? 
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5.3 The Expert Reports and Standards of Scholarship: Forensics and Research 
 
Having discussed the purpose of the historians in the Irving v. Penguin trial and the necessary 
expertise that each brought to the case, it is important to examine how these reports sought to 
counter Irving’s denial as historians for a specific legal purpose. Marc Bloch perceives that 
forensic analysis depends on the use of two kinds of documents, “non-intentional” and 
“intentional”. The combined use of evidence during the trial ranged from memories, diaries, 
letters, and testimony written for a particular purpose, to non-intentional evidence which 
included architectural drawings of Auschwitz, the Einsatzgruppen reports which recorded 
death tolls of mass shootings, and the physical evidence of the camps themselves.316 The 
historian’s approach to constructing the expert witness evidence from both intentional and 
non-intentional documents, was a technique of refuting denial to determine whether Irving’s 
account was reliable and representative of the available evidence.317 Similar to triangulation 
in research, “convergence” of evidence tends to reduce the margin for error by preventing an 
historian’s interpretation from overly imposing on the facts.318 It is in this sense that the 
expert reports presented a forensic analysis of available historical evidence to challenge 
Irving’s methods and his conclusions. 
The following examples from the expert reports from the case help to understand this 
forensic approach further. Combined, the expert reports identified the three key elements of 
denial, which enabled them to systematically tackle Irving’s methods. First, that Holocaust 
deniers deliberately distort evidence to mould their conclusions to what they would like 
history to represent. Second, that their work indicates the pre-eminence of their ideological 
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views, which forces a false agenda onto the historical material. It was Funke’s report which 
effectively argued that Irving’s denial was a product of his neo-Nazi associations, which 
utilised the denial movement to “try to rehabilitate National Socialism as far as it is 
possible.”319 Third, that a reliance on methodologically flawed evidence and data, especially 
from the Leuchter Report, proves that their interpretations are historically invalid.  
Quoting John Wilkins’ treatise, Van Pelt sought to build his case on the levels of 
certainty that could be determined in historical research: “any prejudice to the Truth or 
Certainty of anything, that it is not to be made out of such kind of proof, of which the nature 
of that thing is not capable, provided it be capable of satisfactory proofs of another kind”.320 
In other words, Van Pelt argued that through this forensic analysis of the existing evidence on 
Auschwitz, a level of “moral certainty” could be established.321 Moral certainty however, is 
different to legal certainty. Historians often operate with cautions and nuance in their 
interpretation of evidence, drawing conclusion based on the “balance of probabilities”.322 
Tristram Hunt argues that this “points to a deeper issue about the methodology of the lawyer 
as opposed to the historian and the tension between a focused search for guilt or innocence 
and the more diffuse challenge of presenting ahistorical synthesis.”323 
The concept of “the convergence of evidence” demonstrates how the expert witnesses 
sought to challenge Irving’s reliance on single documents and “single proofs”.324 Van Pelt 
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argues that “our knowledge of the Holocaust depends on tens of thousands of individual 
pieces of information… of different kinds and classes. All those data converge to a 
conclusion. Even if one can point at erroneous information, inconsistencies and 
contradictions–normal occurrences in everyday historical practice–this does not mean that 
these disprove the existence of the gas chambers, or the Holocaust.”325 To demonstrate this, 
Christopher Browning’s position in the functionalist versus the intentionalist 
historiographical debate indicates how historians can differ in their interpretation of finer 
details of evidence.326 Browning made it clear that although his “extensive archival research” 
confirms that there was a systematic program of Jewish persecution in the Nazi regime, he 
argued that historians differ in their interpretation of “Hitler’s precise role in the decision-
making process”.327 Nonetheless, Section 19 in Longerich’s report on “Evidence for Hitler’s 
Leading Role in The Policy of Extermination After 1942”, substantiates and expand on 
Browning’s research to corroborate historical findings.328 It is the collective findings of the 
reports, which provide substantial evidence to refute Irving’s Holocaust denial historical with 
evidence, and adds to the understanding of the kind of collaboration which is essential in 
historical research to reach tenable conclusions about the past.  
The focus of expert reports on evaluating denial against standards of academic 
scholarship provided the court with a guild-line to measure Irving’s methods against. On Day 
18 of the trial Evans, under cross-examination by Irving, countered Irving’s mistranslations 
by reiterating that “the first duty of an historian is to translate from a foreign language in 
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terms that render faithfully the meaning of the original”.329 As Johnathan Freedland argued: 
“the trouble with Irving is that he refuses to accept the basic rules of evidence… It is history 
itself which is on trial here, the whole business of drawing conclusions from evidence. If 
Irving is able to dismiss the testimony of tens of thousands of witnesses, where does that 
leave history?”330 Therefore, to counter denial, certain boundaries and standards of 
scholarship were established, to challenge Irving’s basis for writing history. Evans’ report 
concluded that “if we mean by historian someone who is concerned to discover the truth 
about the past, and to give as accurate a representation of it as possible, then Irving is not an 
historian… Irving is essentially an ideologue who uses history… in order to further his own 
ideological ends in the present”.331  
Evans analysed Irving’s work in a similar vein as Denzin’s standard rules of 
scholarship. The two disciplines of history and law both operate in a similar way, “in 
presenting the results of inquiry… facts must always be verified. The sources of facts must be 
revealed. Contradictory facts should be taken into account, and quotes should never be taken 
out of context”.332 Evans investigated the sources upon which Irving relied, but found that 
“Irving makes it difficult for his readers to investigate the matter further. Footnotes are 
properly used by responsible historians to guide the interested reader to the sources on which 
each claim or statement in the text is based. However, Irving frequently transgresses this 
basic convention of historical scholarship”.333 Evans, under cross-examination by Irving, 
suggested that there should be a distinction between “the attempt to arrive at an objective 
interpretation which is in accordance with the documents, on the one hand, and deliberate 
falsification and invention on the other” concluding that “Holocaust deniers belong to the 
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latter category”.334 It is Van Pelt’s method of verifying the historical record which is central 
to understanding his approach to constructing his 700-page report. Committed to Karl 
Popper’s standards of falsifiability, Van Pelt regarded Popper’s method as “an essential tool 
in the testing of hypotheses” in history.335 The applications which can be drawn from the 
methods of countering Holocaust denial from this trial are highly applicable to other areas of 
historical research also.  
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5.4 Defending History: A Combined Legal and Historical Approach 
At a pre-trial hearing less than 2 months before the trial began, Irving requested that Judge 
Gray exclude Evans’ report from the case because it “sought to define a historian when there 
was no objective standard for doing so”.336 Thus, Evans’ comprehensive report on Irving’s 
repeated historiographical and methodological errors sought to contrast his work against 
clearly defined parameters of professional historical scholarship. Not only was the trial 
significant in holding Irving accountable for his history, the standards of scholarship required 
of the expert witnesses to test Irving’s assumptions suggests that Irving v. Penguin has 
applications to the wider debates on historical practice. Browning’s reflections on the role of 
an expert witness highlights how the legal setting raised standards of scholarship for an 
historian. “The job of the historical expert witness”, according to Browning, “was to set the 
standard of historical competence and integrity in their reports and courtroom testimony 
against which the deniers of the Holocaust could be measured and found wanting”.337  
The significance of Irving v. Penguin, in some ways, lay in the transition from the 
court’s understanding of witness testimony from the Holocaust survivor to the historian as a 
representative of the survivor. As Lipstadt suggests, the case “represent[s] the passing of the 
torch of bearing witness from those who actually experienced the event to those whose tasks 
it is to write about, analyse and unpack its history”.338 The combined historical and legal 
approach suggests that the forensic nature of the expert reports was an effective method of 
countering Holocaust denial.  
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Therese O’Donnell suggests that “when historians appear as expert witnesses, they are 
not ‘doing history’ they are communicating historical expertise in another forum”.339 Does 
this new forum of historical communication prohibit historical practice? The Irving v. 
Penguin case demonstrates that the expert reports were examples of exemplary historical 
research practices. Operating within the framework of libel law, the defence’s legal strategy 
required specific historical expertise to interpret Irving’s claims and to counter his methods. 
Thus, the two approaches to denial were inter-dependent to the cause of countering Holocaust 
denial. As Cicero argued: “the first law for the historian is that he shall never dare utter an 
untruth; the second is that he suppress nothing that is true.”340 Here, Cicero takes a very 
literal and legal approach when describing the role of the historian. Questions as to the extent 
to which Irving “suppressed” truth for his own political purposes form the context for 
understanding methods of countering denial.  
However, being “subjected to hostile cross-examination” as Evans and Van Pelt were 
especially, the historian has to be able to respond to immediate rebuttals to the evidence, 
without referring to literature or archival material to contemplate a thorough response.341 
Although they were well-versed on the content of their reports and the evidence surrounding 
their expertise, defending history takes on a new dimension in the courtroom. However, 
Evans’ experience of being cross-examined, which was published in History and Theory, 
highlighted that although historians are trained to defend evidence for their arguments: 
“It is not the expert’s role to engage in advocacy, or to try to persuade the court to reach one 
particular verdict rather than another… the crucial point is that if there is information which 
may run counter to the case argued by the side commissioning the expert, the expert is not at 
liberty to supress it. An expert has to tell the truth…”342 
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Longerich claimed that some criticisms of their reports under cross-examination were 
“foreseeable” and others were not. To defend historical truth “under severe scrutiny” and 
respond “on the spot”, was an “unusual” experience as an historian.343 Longerich’s 
conclusion is helpful to apply to this research, summarising that the case was a “very 
illuminating experience because it demonstrated clearly that the persuasive power of a 
historical argument depends in essence on evidence obtained from contemporary documents 
of this time”.344 Therefore, Irving’s rhetoric and oratory in the courtroom was insupportable 
because his reliance on faulty evidence was exposed. 
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5.5 Summary 
Forensics, where appropriate, are an effective and legitimate means of historical enquiry and 
can be used to critically investigate historical methods. The Irving v. Penguin trial proved 
most effective in utilising the legal standards of proof to test Irving’s claims. However, the 
historian’s ability to distinguish forensic analysis of the historical evidence from the moral 
and symbolic implications of their research against Irving’s Holocaust denial, demonstrated 
the difficulties in separating forensics from memory. The Irving v. Penguin trial demonstrated 
how historians were able to produce accurate and verifiable conclusions based on the 
convergence of documentary evidence. All four reports went beyond interpretive methods to 
produce forensically analysed historical research. One of the challenges for the historian, 
however, is that their research for the trial is “framed on the one hand by a judgement that 
knows a fact “beyond reasonable doubt,” and on the other hand by the always receding 
horizon that promises unqualified certainty”.345 This does not deny the ability for historians to 
verify historical knowledge and understanding about Auschwitz, but it qualifies that there is a 
limit to the degree of certainty that an historian can provide on aspects which the documents 
do not support. Lipstadt, in her reflections in History on Trial, recalled that Van Pelt’s “report 
not only laid waste to Irving’s claims, but was a stunning example of what historians do”.346 
Mark Grief suggested “the trial allowed professional history to show its inner 
workings in public” which can be analysed as a significant turning point in the perceptions of 
historical research practices. 347 The significance of Irving v. Penguin, lay in the transition 
from the court’s understanding of witness testimony from the Holocaust survivor, to the 
historian as a representative of the survivor. As Lipstadt argues, the case demonstrates that 
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the task of the historian is to witness and to write, analyse and unpack historical material for 
the benefit of subsequent generations.348 The combined historical and legal approach of the 
expert witnesses, suggests that the forensic nature of the expert reports was an effective 
method of countering Holocaust denial.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Comparing Historical and Legal Approaches to Countering Holocaust Denial 
 
There is a danger of loyalty to certain pre-suppositions in history which may not necessarily 
be backed up with evidence. Lipstadt, at times, demonstrated her personal and emotional 
attachment to the subject matter, which shapes her approach to Holocaust denial. Irving, as an 
extreme example, was completely guided by his ideological paradigm and was unable to view 
historical sources in an objective way. To what extent do historians also engage in their own 
forms of distortions? Perhaps, by leaning towards an interpretation of the evidence because it 
supports a certain world-view, or by selecting only the evidence which supports their 
assumption. 
In contrast to Lipstadt’s historical approach, the expert witnesses focused on proving 
the methodological flaws in Irving’s claims, contributing to a wider knowledge of denial. 
While Lipstadt’s approach took a general overview of Holocaust denial, concentrating her 
critiques on the ideology behind denial, Lipstadt’s work did not provide enough detail of the 
claims she made about their mass falsification of evidence. Her work focused more on the 
impact that denial had on memory and the ideological and political aspects of denial which 
mean that she did not dig deep enough into the details of their methodological errors. This 
indicates her paradigm and shows that there are limits to the use of Lipstadt’s work as a guide 
for refuting denial claims as historians. Furthermore, to compare the expert witnesses’ 
historical approach with the more streamlined legal approach, it is Judge Gray’s case 
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Judgment which helps to understand the defence’s legal synthesis better. Judge Gray set out 
“the individual elements which make up that convergence of evidence… at some length” but 
(although not at such length as did van Pelt in his report)”.349 For the sake of clarity for the 
court, therefore, Judge Gray’s systematic approach to the defence’s arguments indicates that a 
legal synthesis of the evidence was much briefer than the historian’s comprehensive analysis 
and focused on addressing the libel claims only.  
What general applications can be extracted from a comparative analysis of the 
historical and legal approaches for the researcher? Ginzburg suggests that history and law 
both hold to an “evidential paradigm.”350 A disparity between history and law is their use of 
evidence to construct an argument. This thesis has stressed the interaction between history 
and law and how this produced a strong defence against Irving. Evans’ claim that the trial, in 
fact, “vindicated history in the most emphatic way.”351 Comparing the structure of legal 
practice against historical practice, Peter Longerich reminds the reader in The Unwritten 
Order that historians can fall into the danger of drawing conclusions or speculating about the 
past when there is no evidence to support it. Argumentum ex silentio, or constructing an 
argument based on the absence of evidence or documents, characterised Irving’s a-historical 
approach.352 Irving’s claim that Hitler never ordered the Final Solution rests on the 
misconception that “one can derive from the absence of a historical document a negative 
conclusion about events” and assumes that “what is not documented therefore never 
existed.”353 If the law deals with certainties, basing its arguments on the existing 
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documentary evidence to build its case, how dissimilar were the legal and historical 
approaches in the Irving v. Penguin trial?  
Justice Charles Gray stated in his judgment that there is a “distinction between my 
judicial role in resolving the issues arising between these parties and the role of the historian 
seeking to provide an accurate narrative of past events.”354 Evans argues that “what the law 
regards as evidence, and what historians treat as such, are in some respects two very different 
things.”355 This may be a true assessment if applied to the criminal proceedings of the Zündel 
trial, when Raul Hilberg’s expert testimony was rejected as “hearsay” because he could not 
produce a written document of Hitler’s order to annihilate the Jews.356 In contrast, Rampton’s 
reliance on the historical evidence provided in the expert reports demonstrates a unique inter-
dependence between lawyers and historians in their methods of countering denial. Since 
denial forces both the judge and the historian to ask which is the most likely version of events 
from the documents? Both, therefore, use the same process of constructing a case, based on 
that evidence.357 Yet alongside different methods of arriving at their conclusions, a historical-
legal approach share a commitment to standards of proof and the convergence of evidence. 
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6.2 The Implications of the Irving v. Penguin Trial for Historical Research and Practice 
 
Shelly Shapiro argues that “the court decision dealt a serious blow to deniers’ efforts to 
elevate denial to the level of serious scholarship and to have it recognized as a subset of the 
study of the history of the Holocaust.”358 It was proved that Irving’s denial was not about 
“engaging in legitimate historical difference in interpretation of evidence”, it was an 
ideologically motivated wilful distortion of the facts.359 Likewise, Lipstadt wrote that the trial 
was useful to the historian because it “allowed my lawyers to demand the release of reams of 
his [Irving’s] personal papers documenting his activities. We know far more about him now 
than we ever did before. We hoisted him on his own petard.”360 Therefore, it has increased 
knowledge as to the nature of denial and has provided the opportunity to critique the methods 
of denial. 
At Nuremberg, the British prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross stated that the 1945 war 
crimes trial would “provide a contemporary touchstone and an authoritative and impartial 
record to which future historians may turn for truth”.361 While the Nuremberg and Eichmann 
trials are were landmark cases of historical significance, which produced further evidence in 
the court to substantiate the accounts of the Nazi officials and their role in the Final Solution, 
thus shaping the memory of the past, Irving v. Penguin had a different goal. Although the 
threat of Holocaust denial is considered, especially by Lipstadt, as a threat to Holocaust 
memory and the historical record, Irving v. Penguin was not based on determining the truth 
about the Holocaust, it was about demonstrating the falsity of Irving’s history. Therefore, 
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there are grounds to argue that the Irving v. Penguin trial had far greater application to the 
practice of history than has been previously stressed. 
 Anthony Julius argues that the case had implications for the way historians engage 
with Holocaust denial, as it “drew a line under everything that proceeded it and represented a 
fresh start” in understanding methods of countering Holocaust denial.362 In this sense, Julius 
concludes that Irving v. Penguin had “almost only historical value.”363 In a court, as in 
history, “documents don’t speak for themselves, you have to have people to speak for them. 
And the people who speak for documents are historians. Historians are the custodians of the 
written record, in that sense, which is the past.”364 Lipstadt argues that the expert reports’ 
“meticulous and detailed findings are a legacy of the trial and another demonstration of the 
impressive growth in the field of Holocaust studies. They constitute a stunning example of 
the proper way to fight Holocaust denial: with facts and evidence rather than emotion or 
law.”365 
Peter Longerich, in reflecting on the impact of this trial for further research, suggested 
that: “I think we should not be too defensive and spend too much time reacting to arguments 
by Holocaust deniers. We should simply spend more effort into research and research 
strategies.”366 While extra care in research practices is an important application from this 
case, it was Irving’s deliberate rather than ill-informed practices which were symptomatic of 
his Holocaust denial, and therefore a more robust rebuttal of its arguments were needed. 
While Holocaust denial continues on the fringes and may not be causing an immediate threat 
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to historical research at this moment in time, it is important to recognise that denial is part of 
a broader phenomenon of the suppression of truth, to serve a political and more convenient 
purpose. These subtle forms of denying the past, manifest in every aspect of historical 
research, as personal agendas and subjectivities, can dominate historian’s paradigms and 
therefore their perceptions of the past.  
Based on the research on Irving v. Penguin, the law seemed to help to challenge 
deniers’ claims to be a legitimate historical “alternative”. Since Holocaust denial incorporates 
an anti-Semitic world-view, European criminal laws have, however, linked Holocaust denial 
to the incitement of racial hatred. An example of this was Roger Garaudy, when he appealed 
to the French government, and later the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), when he 
was convicted of “disputing crimes against humanity, defaming Jews and inciting 
discrimination and racial hatred.”367 The Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UK 
cites Garaudy v France to defend the use of Article 17 to neutralise Holocaust denial, which 
often seeks protection under the freedom of expression of Article 10.368 Erik Bleich 
concludes that “Garaudy’s freedom to deny the Holocaust was clearly outweighed by the 
harm that came from such statements.”369 While Lipstadt contends that no law or government 
intervention should be used against deniers, the European Holocaust denial laws suggest that 
there are limits to the expression of racial hatred which cannot be protected by law. This is an 
important qualification, because the Irving v. Penguin trial proved, in a different sense, that 
defamation law cannot be equally used to attempt to silence those who challenge their work.  
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Giorgio Resta and Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich’s research suggests that laws which 
defend “clearly established historical facts”, as defined in Article 10 of the European Court of 
Human Rights, can provide “an effective instrument to drive out of the market place of ideas 
dealers that lack factual foundation and scientific legitimacy.”370 A caveat, however, is to ask 
to what extent the law should play a role in countering Holocaust denial. Surely it is the 
historian’s role to “drive out” the falsity in the historical record from “the market place of 
ideas”, as one of the fundamentals of historical research and writing. This dissertation has 
sought to argue that the methods used by historians and lawyers, both committed to the truth, 
are able to achieve similar results because of the way that they treat evidence. While the two 
disciplines are committed to establishing facts, the law should not be used as a proxy for 
historical discourse. 
The examination of the methods of countering Holocaust denial from the Irving v. 
Penguin helps to clarify the nuances between Lipstadt’s almost “absolutist” endorsement of 
the freedom of expression in the US, which offers no discrimination between types of speech, 
and the criminalisation of Holocaust denial in Europe which has been criticised by Laurent 
Pech as the “institutionalization of truth.”371 Nonetheless, this research contends that the law 
can be used effectively to neutralise Holocaust denial rather than to criminalise. This 
approach should have a significant effect on scholarly and historical perceptions of the Irving 
v. Penguin case. This neutralisation effect presents a more positive case for potential legal 
and historical interaction when countering Holocaust denial in the UK in the future. 
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6.3 Findings and Applications for Further Research 
 
Based on the brief examination of Rampton and the expert witnesses’ methods and 
approaches to Irving’s Holocaust denial, this research finds that the courtroom provided a 
unique “test-space” to challenge denial and to demonstrate the most meticulous research into 
methods and arguments of Holocaust deniers. The carefully crafted legal defence, addressing 
Irving’s libel allegations by testing Irving as an historian, was an essential strategy to utilise 
this legal test-space to challenge Irving. Irving’s reliance on documents which proved to be 
unverifiable in court highlights how the legal standards of proof provided a “forensic” 
environment and tested the verifiable conclusions.  
The “convergence of evidence” is a helpful concept to apply to establishing historical 
facts and testing the interpretation of those facts. It is stressed that the foundation for the case 
lay in the expert reports, which utilised this specific strategy to verify its conclusions. The 
barrister’s reliance on the expert reports as evidence against Irving in the courtroom indicates 
the inter-relationship between history and law throughout the Irving v. Penguin trial. 
Rampton, Rogers, Julius and Libson’s meticulous preparation for the case demonstrated how 
they utilised a forensic and analytical approach to the evidence. This relationship between 
historians and lawyers strengthens the debate in favour of historical objectivity because the 
court created an environment which demonstrated higher standards of proof. 
The case clarified aspects of the historical record, particularly regarding Auschwitz, 
through the expert reports, which served as a useful source of in-depth research into the 
methodological and ideological flaws of Holocaust denial. One of the impacts of the evidence 
produced at the Irving v. Penguin trial, was that it spurred on new areas of forensic analysis 
and research. An in-depth report was produced and published by Daniel Keren, Jamie 
McCarthy and Harry W. Mazal in 2004 which examined the forensic evidence for Auschwitz 
104 
 
and the holes in the roof of Krema II, which Irving sought to disprove during the course of 
the trial.372 This increase in a forensic approach to historical research indicates that the case 
enhanced and encouraged researchers to question the basis for their knowledge and to utilise 
higher standards of proof in their research practices.  
This research has sought to bring together debates about historical practice and the 
role of the law in combatting Holocaust denial, by suggesting that a combined approach 
which utilises aspects of both history and law was most effective in combatting Irving’s 
denial. This thesis is concerned with identifying methods of countering Holocaust denial 
from within historical discourse, the courtroom and under cross-examination and the legal 
and the historical approach dealt with Irving’s methodological and ideological distortions, as 
a premise for tackling the wider phenomenon of Holocaust denial. Concluding that careful 
and conscientious historians do not deliberately seek to alter the historical record, the Irving 
v. Penguin suggests that history is not just “narrative”, as Munslow suggests.373 By analysing 
the ideological motivations behind Holocaust denial, a more nuanced approach to historical 
practice helps to apply methods of countering denial to other areas of historical research. 
Applying the sociological concept of paradigms, it becomes easier to identify particular 
standpoints or agendas in history which drive interpretations of the past, often going beyond 
that which the evidence suggests. In this sense, there are certain narratives in history which 
can be traced, as Irving’s was, by combining the use of evidence and contextual historical 
interpretation. Identifying the nuances in approaches to countering Holocaust denial from a 
legal and a historical perspective serves as a useful guide to historians who face present 
                                                     
372 Daniel Keren, Jamie McCarthy, Harry W. Mazal, “The Ruins of the Gas Chambers: A Forensic Investigation  
of Crematoriums at Auschwitz I and Auschwitz-Birkenau”, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 18:1,  
(Spring, 2004), pp. 68-103. 
373 Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History, Second Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 71-73. For more  
on the deconstructionist agenda in history, adopted by Munslow and Jenkins in particular see, Alun  
Munslow, Deconstructing History, (London: Routledge, 1997); Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History  
(New York: Routledge, 1991), p. xiii; Keith Jenkins, Refiguring History (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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challenges of historical negationists in other fields also. Can further research benefit from an 
interdisciplinary approach to historical evidence, and apply these concepts to historical 
practice?  
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